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I.

INTRODUCTION

There she met sleep, the brother of death.'

Picture a young woman sitting cross-legged in her apartment discussing with her roommate the somber topics of life
and death on a rainy day over a cup of coffee. During that
"somewhat serious conversation," 2 the woman states that if she
were sick or injured, "she would not want to continue her life
unless she could live 'halfway normally.' ,,3 Next, picture that
young woman lying face down in a ditch after being violently
thrown from her car in an accident, without detectable respiratory or cardiac function. Finally, picture that woman seven
years later lying in a hospital bed. She is in a persistent vegetative state,4 with no hope of returning to cognitive life. Nev* A.B. 1979, Bowdoin College; J.D. 1992, University of Puget Sound School of
Law. The Author wishes to thank Annette Clark, John Mitchell, Chris Rideout, and
Brent Smith for their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this Article.
1. HOMER, THE ILIAD, bk. XIV, 1. 231 & bk. XVI, 1. 672, from HESIOD, THE
THEOGONY, 1. 756.

2. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
3. Id.
4. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2845 n.1. Dr. Fred Plum, the originator of the term
"persistent vegetative state," described the condition as follows:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its
internal controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and
pulmonary ventilation. It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex
activity of muscles and nerves for low level conditioned responses. But there
is no behavioral evidence of either self-awareness or awareness of the
surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (N.J. 1987).
According to the American Medical Association, patients in a persistent vegetative
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ertheless, her body could conceivably survive for another
thirty years. Should a court give effect to that woman's somewhat serious statement? Should a court allow her family to
withhold all artificial nutrition and hydration, thereby letting
her die naturally in the culmination of a process that began
seven years previously on the night that her car crashed?
This thumbnail sketch is in fact the real-life scenario that
confronted a young woman, Nancy Beth Cruzan, her family,
and the courts. In her case, the Missouri Supreme Court
answered the above questions: no. Subsequently, in a decision
that may have raised more questions than it answered, the
United States Supreme Court begrudgingly admitted that the
Constitution would grant a constitutionally protected liberty
interest to refuse lifesaving nutrition and hydration.5 Nevertheless, the Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme Court's decision and delegated the task of crafting appropriate procedures
for safeguarding an incompetent's liberty interest to the "laboratory of the States."' In Missouri, the procedure for safeguarding Nancy Cruzan's liberty interest required that
evidence of her intent about treatment withdrawal must be
proved by clear and convincing evidence.7 Because that standard was not met in her case, the Supreme Court agreed that
Missouri could refuse to allow removal of the artificial hydration and nutrition equipment.
Thus, in Cruzan, the United States Supreme Court
allowed individual states to establish their own procedures for
protecting patients' liberty interests in so-called right-to-die
cases.' Although the Court upheld Missouri's highly restricstate maintain relatively normal brainstem function and thus can regulate "vegetative"
functions, such as heart, lungs, and so forth. Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Medical Association et al. at 14, Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct.
2841 (1990) (No. 88-1503) (hereinafter AMA Brief) (citing Ronald E. Cranford, The
Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts Straight), 18 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 27, 28 (1988)); PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL
PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO
FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT 174 (1983) (hereinafter PRESIDENT'S COMM'N).
They also experience cycles of sleeping and waking; their eyes may move; and they
may smile, utter sounds, or move sporadically. According to the AMA, although this
activity appears to indicate consciousness, there is none. AMA Brief, supra at 14.
Patients in a vegetative state do not feel any pain, sense anybody or anything. In
short, they are completely unaware. Id.
5. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
6. Id. at 2859.
7. Id. at 2852. "Clear and convincing" is a much more rigorous burden of proof in
civil cases, higher than the "preponderance of evidence" standard.
8. Examples of right-to-die cases include: Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health,
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tive procedure, the Court did not advocate that as the only possible procedure.' As a result, each of the fifty states, including
Washington, is free to follow its own course within the confines of Cruzan.
Washington's most recent statement of right-to-die law is
in the 1992 statutory revisions to the Natural Death Act,'0
passed by the legislature in response to a statewide referendum proposing numerous changes to the Act." Although the
revisions clarify Washington's policy on using artificial nutrition and hydration for people in a persistent vegetative state,
the Act only applies to people who have executed a written
directive, or living will, indicating their preferred course of
medical treatment. Thus, the Act does not directly apply to
people like Nancy Cruzan who have not executed a living will.
Washington's most recent common law statement of rightto-die law is the case of In re Grant.'2 The Grant decision
allowed a guardian or family, in conjunction with the patient's
physicians, to act as a surrogate decisionmaker,13 exercising the
rights of an incompetent patient who is in a persistent vegetative state. These rights included the right to removal of artificial nutrition and hydration. 4 The Grant court later amended
110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990); Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1988); Rasmussen ex rel.
Mitchell v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674 (Ariz. 1987); Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal.
Rptr. 840 (Cal. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 399 (1988); Bouvia v. Superior Court,
225 Cal. Rptr. 297 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990); Corbett
v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 492 So. 2d 1331
(Fla. 1986); In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194 (I1. 1990); In re Longeway, 549 N.E.2d
292 (Ill. 1989); In re Gardner, 534 A.2d 947 (Me. 1987); Brophy v. New England Sinai
Hosp., 497 N.E.2d 626 (Mass. 1986); In re Hier, 464 N.E.2d 959 (Mass.), review denied,
465 N.E.2d 261 (1984); In re Jobes, 529 A,2d 434 (N.J. 1987); In re Requena, 517 A.2d
886 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.), aff'd, 517 A.2d 869 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986);
Delio v. Westchester County Medical Ctr., 129 A.D.2d (N.Y. App. Div. 1987).
9. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2854-55, 57-58.
10. 1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.122).
11. See Citizens' Initiative Measure No. 119 (1991) (on file with the University of
Puget Sound Law Review).
12. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), modified, 757 P.2d 534 (1988).
13. The term "surrogate decisionmaking" usually refers to the process whereby a
surrogate or proxy exercises an incompetent's right to refuse treatment. The
surrogate may have been chosen by the person while still competent and instructed to
make medical decisions on her behalf should she become incompetent. See inqfra text
accompanying notes 79-81. In the alternative, the surrogate may be a guardian or
family member requesting the court's permission to make medical decisions for an
incompetent who did not specifically make her wishes known in a living will or
physician's directive before becoming incompetent.
14. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 565, 747 P.2d at 455.
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its decision, 15 however, casting doubt on whether Washington
law still allows the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration. In addition, this modified procedure for withdrawing life-sustaining treatment conflicts with the Washington
Informed Consent Law, 16 making it uncertain which controls.
As a result, Washington law needs clarification.
The legislature should amend Washington law to allow the
removal of life-support measures, including artificial nutrition
and hydration, from an incompetent patient in a persistent
vegetative state. Rather than following the ambiguous
Informed Consent Law, the legislature should adopt the procedure outlined in the first, unmodified Grant decision. That
procedure allows decisions about withholding artificial nutrition and hydration to be made by a surrogate decisionmaker,
either the patient's family or guardian. Treatment can be
withdrawn only if the patient has no reasonable possibility of
return to cognitive and sapient life, and the surrogate has
determined that the patient, if competent, would choose to
refuse treatment. Alternatively, if that intent cannot be determined, treatment can be withheld if it would be in the
patient's best interests.' 7 Unlike the Washington Informed
Consent Law, the original Grant procedure provides safeguards against possible abuses, yet allows a patient's family to
make these private life and death decisions without interference by the courts.
In Part II, this Comment examines the Cruzan decision by
the United States Supreme Court, including the facts of the
case, holding of the court, aftermath of the decision, and longterm effects of the case. Part II also includes an extensive
analysis and critique of Cruzan. Part III examines the status
of Washington law both before and after Cruzan, including the
Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant cases, which have resulted in confusion over the legal status of withholding artificial nutrition
and hydration from incompetent patients in Washington. In
Part IV, this Comment compares Cruzan to the Washington
cases, analyzing the two major impacts of Cruzan and pointing
out why Washington state needs to clarify its law in light of
Cruzan. Finally, this Comment proposes that Washington
15. In re Grant, 757 P.2d 534 (1988) (modifying earlier decision).
16. WASH. REv. CODE § 7.70.065 (1989).
17. Id.

1988).

See also Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 861 (Cal. Ct. App.
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adopt the original Grant procedure. Under that procedure, a
family or guardian may decide, based on the patient's medical
prognosis and the patient's intent or best interests, that artificial life support, including artificial nutrition and hydration,
should be withdrawn and the patient permitted a natural
death.
II.

THE STATUS OF FEDERAL LAW: CRUzAN V. DIRECTOR,
MIssoURI DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

A.

Facts of the Case

On Tuesday, January 11, 1983, at approximately 12:50 a.m.,
Nancy Beth Cruzan was driving her 1963 Rambler Classic
Sedan east on Elm Road in Jasper County, Missouri, on her
way home from work at a Carthage cheese plant. It was a
clear, cool, dry January night."8 For unknown reasons, Nancy
lost control of her Rambler. The car ran off the north side of
the road, hit a mailbox and some small trees, swerved back
across the road to the south side, ran through a fence, overturned several times, and came to rest upside down in a ditch
some 210 feet from the mailbox.1 9 During the collision, Nancy
was thrown about thirty-five feet from her car and landed face
down in the ditch. At 12:54 a.m., the Missouri Highway Patrol
dispatched Trooper Dale Penn to the scene. He arrived at 1:00
a.m. and found Nancy without detectable respiratory or cardiac
function. "She had apparently expired."2 Paramedics Robert
Williams and Rick Maynard arrived at 1:09 a.m., diagnosed
Nancy as code blue, and immediately began cardiopulmonary
resuscitation at 1:11 a.m. Although cardiac function and spQntaneous respiration recommenced by 1:12 a.m., Nancy had suffered significant anoxia, or deprivation of oxygen, for a
minimum of twelve to fourteen minutes.2 '
Nancy was transported to Freeman Hospital where she
was diagnosed with a laceration to the liver and a probable
cerebral contusion compounded by the significant anoxia, with
the prognosis hinging on the unknown duration of her oxygen
18. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 430 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).

19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 431. Note the crucial nine minutes that passed between the arrival of
the state trooper and the paramedics. One wonders whether a different outcome
would have resulted if the trooper had started CPR rather than concluding that Nancy

had died.
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deprivation. 2 Nancy remained in a coma for three weeks
and then progressed to an unconscious state.2 4 To assist recovery and ease feeding, a gastrostomy feeding tube was surgically
implanted in Nancy's stomach on February 5, 1983, with her
then-husband's consent.2 5 Over time, however, efforts to rehabilitate Nancy proved to no avail. After her family attempted
home care at her grandmother's house and at a nursing home
22. Six minutes is the maximum period of oxygen deprivation before the brain
suffers permanent brain damage. The degree of damage depends on the duration of
lack of oxygen, with greater damage resulting from longer periods. Id. at 430.
Although some people, particularly children, have recovered from anoxia, the
circumstances usually involve the face being thrust in icy water, which triggers a
physiological response. This circumstance was not present in Nancy's case. The
damage from her anoxia was later confirmed by CT scans showing significant
degeneration of her cerebral cortical tissue. Id. at 432.
23. Coma, along with brain death and the vegetative state, are the three major
categories of sustained and total loss of consciousness. AMA Brief, supra note 4, at 13.
In all three, the cerebral hemispheres, which are responsible for conscious behavior,
do not function. As a result, the patient has no thoughts, feelings, sensations, desires,
emotions, memory, pain, or suffering. Id. at 13 (citing PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, SuP/ra
note 4, at 174)). Brain death, coma, and the vegetative state differ in the extent to
which the brainstem, which controls unconscious activity, still functions. In brain
death, the patient has suffered complete and irreversible loss of brainstem function,
including the ability to regulate "vegetative" functions, such as heart, lungs, kidneys,
and so forth. Id. at 14 (citing PLUM & POSNER, THE DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 1
(3d. ed. 1982); PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 4, at 175).
Coma is a condition that exists between brain death and the vegetative state. The
brainstem retains some function but not as much activity as in a vegetative state.
Unlike someone in a vegetative state, see supra note 4, a person in a coma is in a sleeplike state, with eyes closed, impaired breathing, and no reflexes. Id. at 15 (citing PLUM
& POSNER, supra, at 5). Comas and vegetative states also differ in length. Comas
rarely last longer than four weeks. By that time, the patient has either died, entered a
vegetative state, or begun to regain some consciousness. Id. at 15.
Patients have recovered from both comas and vegetative states, but their prognosis
depends on multiple factors. For patients, children in particular, whose vegetative
state is caused by head injury, their possibility of recovery after a long delay is greater.
One eighteen-year-old emerged from a persistent vegetative state 30 months after
injury. Id. at 17 (citing W.F.M. Arts et al., Unexpected Improvement After Prolonged
Posttraumatic Vegetative State, 48 J. NEUROLOGY, NEUROSURGERY & PSYCH. 1300
(1985)).
For patients such as Nancy, however, whose condition was caused by
"hypoxiaischemia," or a lack of oxygen to the brain, significant recovery is rare.
Although an estimated 100,000 patients over the last 20 years have been in persistent
vegetative states because of oxygen deprivation, only three recoveries have been
documented. Moreover, none of those lingered in a vegetative state for as long as
Nancy. Id. at 16 (citing Shuttleworth, Recovery to Social and Economic Independence
From ProlongedPostanoxic Vegetative State, 33 NEUROLOGY 372 (1983)).
24. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 431 (Mo. 1988).
25. Prior to the accident, Nancy lived with her husband, Paul; they had been
married about a year. After Nancy's accident, her parents were appointed guardians
and conservators following a court hearing on January 25, 1977. Nancy's husband did
not attend or inquire about the proceedings. A dissolution of marriage was
subsequently decreed. Id.
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following a bout with 107 degree fever, Nancy was eventually
placed in Mount Vernon State Hospital.26 She remained
unconscious, with muscular atrophy and contracture of her
four extremities, causing her fingernails to cut into her wrists.
Her condition was described as follows:
(1) [H]er respiration and circulation are not artificially
maintained and are within the normal limits of a thirty-yearold female;
(2) she is "oblivious to her environment except for reflexive responses to sound and perhaps painful stimuli";
(3) she suffered anoxia of the brain resulting in severe
brain damage. "A recent CAT [sic] scan of her head reveals
abnormalities suggesting severe irreversible upper hemisphere brain damage with massive enlargement of ventricles
filling with cerebrospinal fluid because the brain is degenerating." The degeneration is called "cerebral cortical atrophy,
which is progressive from her initial condition reflected on
the CAT [sic] scan. The fluid is replacing the area where
there is no more brain tissue.... This cerebral cortical atrophy is irreversible, permanent, progressive, and ongoing";
(4) "her highest cognitive brain function is exhibited by her
grimacing perhaps in recognition of ordinarily painful stimuli indicating the experience of her pain and apparent
response to sound";
(5) she is a spastic quadriplegic;
(6) her four extremities are contracted with irreversible
muscular and tendon damage to all extremities;
(7) "she has no cognitive or reflexive ability to swallow
food or water to maintain her daily essential needs," and
"she will never recover her ability to swallow sufficient [sic]
27
to satisfy her needs.

Nancy was in a persistent vegetative state but was not dead.28
26. The entire cost of Nancy's care was borne by the state of Missouri after
Nancy's Social Security medical insurance ran out in 1986. Id. at 432. The cost

estimates ranged from $112,000 to $130,000 per year. Tamar Lewin, Nancy Cruzan
Dies, Outlived by Debate Over Right to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al; Robert
Steinbrook, Comatose Woman Dies 12 Days After Life Support Halted, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 27, 1990, at A3.
27. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411, 432.
28. Id. Under Missouri law, death is defined as follows:
For all legal purposes, the occurrence of human death shall be determined in
accordance with the usual and customary standards of medical practice,
provided that death shall not be determined to have occurred unless the

following minimal conditions have been met:
(1)

When respiration and circulation are not artificially maintained, there is

an irreversible cessation of spontaneous respiration and circulation; or
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Neither was she diagnosed as terminally ill because she could
continue in this condition for another thirty years as long as
she continued to receive artificial nutrition and hydration. 9
In 1987, four years after the accident, with no hope of
recovery in sight, Nancy's parents and co-guardians, Lester and
Joyce Cruzan, requested that the hospital terminate her artificial hydration and nutrition30 The hospital refused to honor
their request without court approval. As a result, on October
23, 1987, the Cruzans petitioned Jasper County Probate Judge
Charles E. Teel, Jr., for a declaratory judgment allowing them
to remove her feeding tube."'
On July 27, 1988, Judge Teel issued an order granting the
Cruzans' request for termination. 2 Judge Teel stated that a
person in Nancy's condition had a fundamental natural right
under the Missouri and United States Constitutions, a "right to
liberty," which permits a person to refuse or direct the withdrawal of "artificial death prolonging procedures."3 However,
the public policy of the Missouri General Assembly as embodied in the Missouri Living Will Statute' prohibited the withholding of nutrition and hydration under all circumstances. As
a result, state policy was in direct conflict with Nancy's constitutional right to liberty. The court held that denying her coguardians the authority to exercise Nancy's constitutionally
guaranteed right to liberty would violate her right to due process and equal protection of the law under state and federal
constitutions.3 5
Once the court found that Nancy had a constitutionally
guaranteed liberty interest, the court next had to determine
how she would want that interest exercised. The court found
(2) When respiration and circulation are artificially maintained, and there is
total and irreversible cessation of all brain function, including the brain stem
and that such determination is made by a licensed physician.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 194.005 (1986).
29. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
30. Id. at 410.

31. Id. at 410, 432; Cruzan's Right-to-Die Case, CHIC. TRIB., Dec. 15, 1990, § News,
at 8 [hereinafter Right-to-Die Case].
32. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 410, 434; Right-to-Die Case, supra note 31, at
8.
33. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 434.
34. Mo. REV. STAT. § 459.010 (1986). Note the statute did not directly apply to
Nancy Cruzan because she never drafted a living will. In fact, the statute was not
adopted until after her accident. Therefore, the court looked to the statute only for a
general expression of state policy on withholding treatment.
35. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 410, 434.
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that Nancy's intent regarding the withholding of artificial
nutrition and hydration was expressed by a "somewhat serious
conversation" with her friend, Athena Comer,' by other statements to family and friends, and by the overwhelming evidence of her lifestyle as a vivacious, outgoing, independent
person who preferred to take care of herself. Based on these
criteria, the court concluded that Nancy would not want to
continue with artificial nutrition and hydration in her current
condition." As a result, the court authorized Nancy's parents
and co-guardians, Joyce and Lester Cruzan, to exercise her
constitutionally guaranteed right to withhold nutrition and
hydration. The guardian ad litem-s and the State appealed.
On November 16, 1988, the Missouri Supreme Court
reversed in a 4-3 decision, holding that the Cruzans lacked
authority to effectuate their request because no clear and convincing evidence existed of Nancy's desire to have life-sustaining treatment withdrawn under such circumstances. 39 The
court stated that a person's right to refuse treatment, regardless of whether from a constitutional right or a common law
right, is not absolute, but must be balanced against the state's
interest in life. The state's interest was not in quality of life,
but was a strong, unqualified policy in favor of the preservation of life, as embodied in the Missouri Living Will Statute.4 °
Because Nancy was alive and the burdens of her treatment
were not excessive to her,4 ' the court ruled that her right to
36. At age twenty-five, during this somewhat serious conversation with her
housemate, Athena Comer, Nancy stated that if she were sick or injured she would not
want to continue living unless "she could live at least halfway normally." Id. at 433.
37. Id. at 432-33 (quoting Judge Teel's Order of July 27, 1988).
38. Although Nancy's parents were appointed as her guardians, once they became
a party petitioning the court to authorize removal of her artificial treatment, they had
a potential conflict of interest. In addition, Nancy was a ward of the State of Missouri,
which was bearing the entire cost of her care in the Mt. Vernon State Hospital. See
supra note 26. As a result, the court appointed as guardians ad litem and attorneys for
the State's ward, Thad C. McCanse and David Mouton. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d
at 433.
The guardians ad litem found themselves in the predicament of agreeing with the
Cruzans and Nancy's doctors that it was in Nancy's best interest to disconnect the
feeding tube. Nevertheless, because the case was one of first impression in Missouri,
the guardians believed that it was their duty as Nancy's attorneys to appeal the ruling
to the highest court in the state. Id. at 410 n.1. For a discussion of the duties of the
guardian versus the guardian ad litem, see infra note 152.
39. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 434-36, 443.
40. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
41. The court based this statement on evidence from the trial court indicating that
Nancy's care did not cause her pain. The court concluded that her care was not
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refuse treatment did not outweigh the "immense, clear fact of
The court
life in which the state maintains a vital interest."'
disagreed with Judge Teel, stating that Nancy's conversation
with Athena Comer was not reliable 43 for determining Nancy's
intent and was insufficient to support her parents' request to
exercise her right to withdraw treatment. In conclusion, the
court held that no person could assume the choice of terminating medical treatment for an incompetent person without clear
and convincing, inherently reliable evidence of that person's
intent.44 Because such evidence was absent,4 5 the Missouri
burdensome to her because she was not responsive to it. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d at 424.
42. Id.
43. As Judge Higgins noted in his dissent to the Missouri Supreme Court decision,
this testimony by Athena Comer about her conversation with Nancy took only half-anhour during a three-day trial. But this testimony was not the sole basis for Judge
Teel's conclusion that Nancy would choose to remove the feeding tube. In addition to
Ms. Coiner's testimony, the court heard other evidence relevant to Nancy's intent,
including statements of family, friends, and in particular, Nancy's sister, Christy.
When, after three days of testimony, Judge Teel concluded that Nancy would choose
to remove the feeding tube, he based his conclusion not only on Ms. Corner's evidence,
but also on "other statements to family and friends" and the overwhelming evidence of
"[h]er life-style." Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 443-44 (Higgins, J., dissenting)
(quoting Tr.Ct.Op. 4, 6 (L.F. 254, 256)). Both the Missouri Supreme Court and the
United States Supreme Court, however, focused only on the "somewhat serious
conversation," largely ignoring this additional testimony. In finding that evidence of
Nancy's intent was not clear and convincing, the Supreme Court reasoned that this
conversation did not focus specifically on the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and
hydration. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1990). The
Missouri court noted that informally expressed reactions to another's medical
condition could not constitute clear proof of intent. Evidence offered to prove
informed consent, or the informed refusal to consent, must be stronger than remote,
general, spontaneous statements made in casual circumstances. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760
S.W.2d at 411, 424, 443-44.
44. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 423-25, 443.
45. Note that the Missouri Supreme Court goes beyond simply clarifying the
evidentiary standard and actually reverses the trial court's factual findings based on
that new standard. Moreover, the United States Supreme Court does not challenge
this factual determination. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855. One interesting and
unanswered question is why both appellate courts chose to reverse the trial court's
factual finding and hold that the testimony did not amount to clear and convincing
evidence of Nancy's intent to have treatment withdrawn. Not only did they ignore
factual evidcnce (see supra note 43), but as appellate courts, their determination was
based on a "cold" record. Usually factual findings are more appropriately made by a
trial court, which is in the best position to weigh evidence presented by witnesses and
judge their demeanor, credibility, and so forth. Perhaps a more prudent course for the
appellate courts would have been to clarify that the evidentiary standard was "clear
and convincing" and remand the case to the trial court for factual findings in
accordance with that standard. In effect, of course, that is what happened when
Nancy's family petitioned the trial court with new evidence, which the court
determined did meet that higher standard. See infra part II.D.
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Supreme Court reversed the lower court order, refusing
Nancy's parents' request to terminate her artificial nutrition
and hydration.4 6
The Cruzans petitioned the United States Supreme Court,
which granted certiorari4 7 and affirmed the Missouri Supreme
Court decision on June 25, 1990.48
B. Holding of the Court
The issue before the United States Supreme Court was
whether Nancy had a right under the United States Constitution that would require the hospital to withdraw her life-sustaining treatment under the particular circumstances of her
case.49 The Court separated the issue into two subparts: (1)
does the Constitution grant a right to die; and (2) does the
Constitution prohibit Missouri from choosing the rule of decision that it did to effectuate that right.5"
In answering the first question, the Court noted that, .at
common law, touching a person without consent or legal justification is a battery.5 No right is more sacred than an individual's right to possession and control of his own person, free
from restraint or interference of others.52 The logical corollary
to this notion of bodily integrity and autonomy is that a person
must give informed consent for medical treatment. Otherwise,
the doctor's "touching" will be considered battery. As Justice
Cardozo stated: "Every human being of adult years and sound
mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
damages. '53 The natural counterpart of the informed consent
doctrine is that a person possesses the right not to consent but
to refuse treatment4
After examining this common law foundation, the Court
found constitutional support for the doctrine of informed con46. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d at 426-27.
47. 109 S. Ct. 3240 (1989).
48. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
49. Id at 2846.
50. Id. at 2851.
51. Id. at 2846.
52. Id.
53. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2846 (quoting Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp.,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
54. Id. at 2847.
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sent in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.5 5 "The principle that a competent person has a
constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment may be inferred from our prior decisions. '
As a result, the Court concluded that, at least hypothetically,
"the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition.""7
Nancy's parents, as petitioners, claimed that an incompetent person possesses the same right to refuse treatment as a
competent person.5" The Court, however, concluded that peti55. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (no State shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
56. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851. See Washington v. Harper, 110 S. Ct. 1028 (1990)
(holding forcibly injecting medication into a nonconsenting person "represents a
substantial interference with that person's liberty"); Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 494
(1980) (holding mandatory behavior modification treatment combined with transfer to
mental health hospital implicated liberty interests); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 600
(1979) (holding both children and adults have a "substantial liberty interest in not
being confined unnecessarily for medical treatment"); Breithaupt v. Abrams, 352 U.S.
432, 439 (1957) (holding individual's right that her person be held inviolable is balanced
against the interests of society); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 24-30 (1905)
(holding a person's liberty interest in refusing unwanted smallpox vaccine is balanced
against state's interest in disease prevention).
57. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852. Prior to Cruzan, many state court decisions found a
right to refuse medical treatment within a generalized constitutional right to privacy.
In Cruzan, however, the Court stated that it has never held that such a right is
encompassed within a right of privacy. Instead, this right "is more properly analyzed
in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest." Id. at 2851 n.7. For a
discussion of the impact of proceeding under a liberty interest analysis versus a right
of privacy analysis, see infra part IV.A.
58. The Court never expressly answered the question whether an incompetent has
the same liberty interest in refusing treatment as a competent person. The Cruzans
claimed that the Court's refusal to grant an incompetent person the same liberty
interest as a competent person would violate Nancy's right to equal protection under
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court rejected this claim, however, on the basis that
competent and incompetent persons are not similarly situated. The difference
between the choice made by a competent person and the choice made for an
incompetent person is "so obviously different that the State is warranted in
establishing rigorous procedures for the latter class of cases which do not apply to the
former class." Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 n.12.
Nevertheless, Cruzan does extend this liberty interest to an incompetent person as
well as a competent one, at least to the extent that the Missouri rule of decision
sufficiently protected that liberty interest. In other words, under the Missouri
procedural rule, where probative evidence could establish by clear and convincing
evidence the incompetent's intent to terminate life-sustaining treatment, the Cruzan
court was willing to allow a surrogate to exercise that incompetent's "liberty interest"
or "right" to refuse treatment. However, the Court left for a later day the decision of
whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires that a state must defer to the decision
of a surrogate previously appointed by the patient while competent. See infra text
accompanying notes 79-81. Certainly a decision by the United States Supreme Court
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tioners' claim begged the question. According to the Court, the
crux of the matter is that an incompetent person is unable to
make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise any right,
including a supposed right to refuse treatment. Only a surrogate may exercise that right for her.5 9
Under Missouri common law, a surrogate may exercise an
incompetent's right to refuse artificial nutrition and hydration,
but only if evidence of the person's intent expressed while
competent is proved by clear and convincing evidence.'
By
establishing this procedural safeguard, Missouri seeks to protect not only the individual's choice, but also the state's interest in the preservation of life. Thus, in effect, Missouri
balances the individual's non-absolute constitutional right to
refuse treatment against the state's high interest in preserving
life. In this case, these interests are advanced by adopting a
clear and convincing evidentiary standard to prove the person's
intent. The Supreme Court held that the state's interest promoted by this evidentiary standard was legitimate and did not
impermissibly burden the individual's liberty interest. Therefore, the procedural requirement was not unconstitutional. 6 '
The Missouri evidentiary standard was legitimate, according to the Court, because determining the existence of a due
process "liberty interest" in avoiding unwanted medical treatment is only the beginning of the inquiry. A person's rights
under the Due Process Clause are not absolute.6 2 Whether
that person's liberty interest has been violated must be determined by balancing her right against the relevant state interests.63 If the state's interests are compelling, they will
outweigh her liberty interest, and her due process rights will
not have been unconstitutionally infringed.
The primary state interest in this case is the preservation
of life.64 Missouri's interest in preserving life is advanced by its
heightened evidentiary requirements, which seek to protect
that a state need not defer to a surrogate's decision would undercut the liberty interest
that the Court extended to incompetent individuals.
59. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
60. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 443 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub noma. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
61. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-56.
62. Id. at 2851-52. See Mills v. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299 (1982); Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982).
63. For a discussion of the four state interests usually cited, see infra text
accompanying note 163.
64. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
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the individual and safeguard the personal element of choice
between life and death.6 According to the Court, such a
requirement would guard against potential abuses. 66 For
example, a family member might be unavailable to serve as a
surrogate decisionmaker or might not act to protect the
patient. The proceeding might not be an adversarial one that
would assure accurate factfinding.6 7 Furthermore, as the
Court noted, the interests at stake are "more substantial, on
both the individual and societal level, than those involved in a
run-of-the-mine [sic] civil dispute." 6 Therefore, the Court
held that Missouri could permissibly place the increased risk of
a wrong decision on the surrogate seeking to terminate an
incompetent individual's treatment. The Court agreed that
Missouri, by adopting such a procedural rule, could assert an
unqualified interest in the preservation of human life to be
weighed against the individual's constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. 9
Finally, the Court held that the Due Process Clause does
not require the Court to repose a right of substituted judgment. ° The Due Process Clause only requires the state to
repose judgment on choices about medical treatment with the
65. Id. at 2852-53.
66. Id. at 2853.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853-54.
70. Id. at 2855-56. In order to allow a surrogate to exercise an incompetent's right
to refuse treatment, courts have adopted a number of tests to determine the patient's
wishes if she never wrote down her intentions about refusing life-sustaining treatment.
The first is the "substituted judgment" or subjective test. Under this legal standard,
the proxy must prove that the patient would choose nontreatment if she could speak.

If the patient left no written statements about her intent, the proxy must render her
best judgment about whether the patient would exercise her right to refuse treatment
under her particular circumstances.
Courts and commentators have criticized the substituted judgment test because,
"absent a prior directive, the proxy's assessment of what the patient would want, no
matter how scrupulously performed, relies to some extent upon the proxy's values in
addition to the patient's." Nancy K. Rhoden, Litigating Life and Death, 102 HARv. L.
REV. 375, 377 (1988) [hereinafter Rhoden, LitigatingLife]. For example, although the
Quinlan court noted that most people would not want to live in Karen Quinlan's state,
this was not a statement of what Karen would have preferred. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d
647, 664 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 992 (1976). In addition, the proxy's conclusions
may be highly intuitive and based not on specific statements or actions but on love and
intimacy. Such analysis is often unable to meet the "clear and convincing" standard of
proof that is often required in cases like Cruzan. Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra, at
377. This test fails most dramatically when the patient has never been competent
because no one, including the patient, can ever know what he or she would want. Id.
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patient herself.7 ' Because Missouri's evidentiary requirement
seeks to give effect to the patient's choices, it does not violate
the Due Process Clause. Thus, on the facts of this case, the
Court agreed with the Missouri Supreme Court that evidence
of Nancy's intent regarding the removal of artificial nutrition
at 376. See also Allen E. Buchanan, The Limits of Proxy Decisionmaking for
Incompetents, 29 UCLA L. REV. 386 (1981).
Consequently, courts uncomfortable with the substituted judgment test have often
adopted an "objective" or "best-interests" test. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209
(N.J. 1985). Under this test, absent clear and convincing evidence of the patient's
subjective desires, the proxy must perform a balancing test to determine the best
interests of the patient: the proxy must prove that the burden of the patient's life, in
terms of unavoidable pain, clearly outweighs any physical, emotional, or intellectual
benefit. Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra, at 376. The "limited-objective" test includes
both a subjective prong, analyzing evidence of the patient's intent, and an objective
prong, weighing the benefits and burdens. In the "pure objective" test, only the
benefits and burdens are weighed.
Objectivists prefer this test, arguing that one cannot invoke "the patient's values"
because an unconscious or barely conscious patient no longer has higher-level interests
or values. Moreover, even when an individual has clearly manifested her intent in a
calm, lucid manner and drafted a living will choosing to refuse treatment, no one can
be certain that what she would chose earlier is what she would choose now. For
example, a person's views about what is an acceptable level of functionality may
change drastically as that function declines. Id. at 411-12. This view also casts doubt
on the evidentiary value of treatment guidelines from living wills because, at least
hypothetically, the patient may now want something else. See, e.g., Rebecca Dresser,
Life, Death, and Incompetent Patients: Conceptual Infirmities and Hidden Values in
the Law, 28 ARiz. L. REV. 373 (1986). Thus, these commentators argue for a presentoriented test, in which the benefits and burdens of the patient's current situation are
objectively assessed.
Other commentators, however, point out that even "objective" tests have
subjective elements; in weighing the supposed burdens and benefits, the proxy's own
subjective values creep into the analysis of whether something is a benefit or burden.
Moreover, the analysis is skewed because, according to medical experts, many of the
factors listed on the "burden" side of the equation, such as pain and suffering, do not
exist for a patient in a persistent vegetative state. Finally, these commentators object
to a present best-interests standard that bifurcates the now-unconscious person into a
"past person," with one set of interests, and a "current person" with a different set.
Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra, at 378. They argue that we cannot bifurcate people in
this way. We must see them not only in the present, but also as the persons they were.
"Viewing the patient only in the present divides her from her history, her values, and
her relationships-from all those things that made her a moral agent." Nancy K.
Rhoden, The Limits of Legal Objectivity, 68 N.C. L. REV. 845 (1990) [hereinafter
Rhoden, Legal Limits]. Rather, for purposes of moral decisionmaking, we must view
patients' values as extending forward in time, even if their values were not clearly
expressed. Respect for the person demands that we give effect to their future choices.
Otherwise, denying the right of future choice threatens the right of present choice. Id.
at 865. Thus, these commentators bring the discussion full circle, back to the
subjective standard. They contend that "the reasonableness of a choice to stop
treatment should be evaluated by considering the patient as a whole, including her
values, her physical and emotional interests, and her ability to experience and enjoy
life." Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra,at 379.
71. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.
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and hydration was not proved by clear and convincing
72

evidence.

In summary, the Court held:
1) a person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest
in refusing unwanted medical treatment including artificial
nutrition and hydration;
2) the Due Process Clause requires that this right only lies
with the individual; therefore, a state may protect its interest in life by requiring a surrogate to prove an incompetent's
intent about exercising this right by clear and convincing
evidence before exercising that person's right;
3) this clear and convincing evidentiary requirement represents a legitimate state interest balanced against the individual's liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical
treatment;
4) because the petitioners failed to prove Nancy's intent
regarding medical treatment by the clear and convincing
standard, Missouri could refuse to withdraw the artificial
feeding tube. As a result, the judgment of the Missouri
Supreme Court was affirmed.
C. Concurrencesand Dissents
Justices O'Connor and Scalia concurred in the majority's
opinion but also wrote separately. Justice Brennan wrote a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined. Justice Stevens also wrote a separate dissent.
1.

Concurrences.

In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor wrote separately to
clarify why a protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted
medical treatment could be inferred from the Court's prior
decisions and why refusing artificial nutrition and hydration is
encompassed within that interest. 3 In discussing this liberty
interest in the majority opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist had
stated that "for purposes of this case, we assume that the
United States Constitution would grant a competent person a
constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration
and nutrition. '74 Although he appears in this statement to
begrudgingly acknowledge that a liberty interest exists, he
couches this concession in tentative, parsimonious language,
72. Id. at 2854-55. See supra note 45.
73. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
74. Id. at 2852 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
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casting doubt on whether a liberty interest in fact exists or
would be protected in all cases.7 5 O'Connor clearly believed it
necessary to elaborate on this statement, explaining why this
liberty interest does in fact exist and is implicated in cases
such as Cruzan. Justice O'Connor noted:
[T]he liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows
from decisions involving the State's invasions into the body.
Because our notions of liberty are inextricably entwined
with our idea of physical freedom and self-determination,
the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body
repugnant to the interests protected by the Due Process
Clause.... The State's imposition of medical treatment on
an unwilling competent adult necessarily involves some
form of restraint and intrusion. A seriously ill or dying
patient whose wishes are not honored may feel a captive of
the machinery required for life-sustaining measures or other
medical interventions. Such forced treatment may burden
that individual's
liberty interests as much as any state
76
coercion.

Justice O'Connor concluded that the State's provision of
artificial nutrition and hydration implicates identical concerns.
According to Justice O'Connor, "artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of medical treatment."'7 7
Even if it is not "medical treatment," it nevertheless clearly
involves some degree of intrusion and restraint: "Requiring a
competent adult to endure such procedures against her will
burdens the patient's liberty, dignity, and freedom to deter7' 8
mine the course of her own treatment.
Justice O'Connor also wrote separately to explain that the
Court was not deciding the issue of whether a State must give
75. Justice Rehnquist states as follows: "Although we think the logic of the cases
discussed above would embrace such a liberty interest, the dramatic consequences
involved in refusal of such treatment would inform the inquiry as to whether the
deprivation of that interest is constitutionally permissible." Id. (emphasis added).
Although this language is unclear, Rehnquist appears to be saying that under certain
dramatic circumstances, it would be constitutionally permissible to deny a person's
liberty interest in order to prevent him or her from taking that "dramatic" action.
76. Id. at 2956-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing COUNCIL ON ETHICAL AND
JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMA ETHICAL OPINION 2.20,
WITHHOLDING OR WITHDRAWING LIFE-PROLONGING MEDICAL TREATMENT, CURRENT
OPINIONS 13 (1989) [hereinafter AMA ETHICAL OPINION 2.20]; THE HASTINGS CENTER,
GUIDELINES ON THE TERMINATION OF LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT AND THE CARE OF
THE DYING 59 (1987) [hereinafter HASTINGS GUIDELINES]).

78. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

266

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 16:249

effect to the decisions of a patient's duly appointed surrogate
decisionmaker. Again, Chief Justice Rehnquist had raised
doubts in his majority opinion about whether a State would be
constitutionally mandated to implement such decisions. 9 In
her concurrence, however, O'Connor points out that the Court
did not in fact reach that issue in Cruzan; neither would the
Court be precluded from finding in the future that such a duty
is constitutionally required to protect a patient's liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment."0 O'Connor
appears to believe that it is.
Note that, in making this statement, O'Connor is not
referring to surrogate decisionmaking such as in Cruzan,
where a surrogate makes the choice for an incompetent based
on an analysis of the incompetent's previous statements about
refusing medical treatment. Instead, she is referring to a situation in which a competent person appoints a proxy to make
health care decisions on her behalf in the event that she
becomes incapacitated. O'Connor further notes that delegating
authority to make medical decisions to a family member or
friend is becoming common. Several states have recognized
the wisdom of this procedure by enacting durable power of
attorney statutes, specifically authorizing an individual to
appoint a surrogate for making medical treatment decisions.
O'Connor concludes that, because most patients are likely to
select a family member as a surrogate, "giving effect to a
proxy's decisions may also protect the 'freedom of personal
choice in matters of... family life.' "81
Justice Scalia, on the other hand, believes that the federal
courts have no business in this field. In his concurrence, he
focuses on the State's power to prevent suicide-including suicide by refusing to take appropriate measures necessary to preserve one's life. 2 According to Scalia, the Constitution does
not designate the point at which life becomes worthless and
the means preserving it become extraordinary or inappropriate. Neither do the nine Justices of the Court know any more
about life-and-death than "nine people picked at random from
the Kansas City telephone directory." ' To Scalia, the collective citizenry of a state, through their elected representatives,
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

See supra text accompanying notes 70-71.
Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2857-58 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id.
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should be the ones deciding whether a patient's wish to refuse
life-preserving measures will be honored. In Scalia's opinion,
those wishes should not be honored. He traces the history of
suicide, which at common law was criminally liable, and concludes that "starving oneself to death is no different from putting a gun to one's temple."8 4
2.

Dissents

The dissenting Justices contest the conclusions of the
majority. Justice Brennan argues that if a person has a constitutional liberty interest in avoiding unwanted medical care,
that right must be fundamental. The right to be free from
medical attention without one's consent is a basic civil right
"deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition. "85 The
source of this right, Brennan notes, is Anglo-American law's
premise of self-determination. Thus, freedom from unwanted
medical treatment is "unquestionably among those principles
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be
ranked as fundamental."'
Even though serious consequences
may result from refusing medical treatment, those consequences do not vitiate the right under our common law tradition of medical self-determination. Every competent adult has
the right to forego treatment "if it entails what for him are
intolerable consequences or risks, however unwise his sense of
values may be to others.""7 Nor does Nancy Cruzan lose this
fundamental right because she is incompetent and unable to
exercise that right. Brennan notes that those who are irreversibly ill with loss of brain function, like children and the insane,
all retain "rights." However, those rights are only meaningful
if they can be exercised by an agent on behalf of the other.
"To deny [its] exercise because the patient is unconscious or
84. Id. at 2861 (Scalia, J., concurring).

85. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192 (1986) (quoting Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503
(1977))).
86. Id. at 2865 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.

97, 105 (1934)).
87. Id. at 2866 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Downer v. Veilleux, 322 A.2d 82,
91 (Me. 1974)); see also Tune v. Walter Reed Army Medical Hospital, 602 F. Supp. 1452,
1455 (D.C. 1985). Exceptions have been made when dependent children are involved.
See, e.g., Application of President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000, 1008, cer denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (ordering blood transfusion for mother of
infant); Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 422 n.17 (Mo. 1988) (citing cases in which
Missouri courts ordered blood transfusions for children over their parents' religious
objections).
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incompetent would be to deny the right."8 8
Justice Brennan concedes that the right to be free of
unwanted medical treatment, like other constitutionally protected interests, may not be absolute. Nevertheless, in Justice
Brennan's opinion, no state interest in this case outweighs the
individual's interest in self-determination to make profound,
personal choices about dying.8 9
Justice Stevens also dissented. He argues that Nancy
Cruzan's liberty interest in being free from medical treatment
must be understood in light of her particular facts and circumstances. In his view, the Constitution requires the state to care
for the patient's life in a manner that respects her own best
interests. 90 Stevens argues that in this case the state has
largely ignored Nancy's best interests. He concludes that the
Missouri regulation is an unreasonable intrusion upon traditionally private matters encompassed within the liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause. 9
D.

Aftermath of Cruzan

Because the Supreme Court agreed with the Missouri
Supreme Court that Nancy's family lacked clear and convincing evidence of her intent regarding withdrawal of artificial
nutrition and hydration, Nancy remained in the Missouri state
hospital with the totality of her nutrition and hydration
received through a gastrostomy tube.
On August 30, 1990, the Cruzans asked Judge Teel for a
new hearing because three friends of Nancy's had come forward with additional information about Nancy's intent after
hearing the publicity surrounding the Supreme Court decision.9 2 In September, the State of Missouri unexpectedly withdrew from the new proceedings, stating that Missouri no
longer had "a recognizable legal interest" in the case and
would no longer contest the Cruzans' attempts to take their
daughter off artificial nutrition and hydration.9 3 The State's
88. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2867 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Foody v.
Manchester Memorial Hospital, 482 A.2d 713, 718 (Conn. 1984)).
89. Id. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
90. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2879 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

91. Id. at 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
92. Malcolm Gladwell, Court Rules Woman Has Right to Die, WASH. POST, Dec.
15, 1990, at Al.

93. Id. The withdrawal by the State, claiming no recognizable legal interest in the
case and a willingness to accede to the Cruzans' attempts to end their daughter's life,
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withdrawal left no official party with standing before the court
to oppose the family's motion.
At a November hearing, the three friends testified about
conversations with Nancy in which she stated that she would
never want to live "like a vegetable."94 Two of the friends,
who had worked with Nancy at a school for deaf and blind
children in 1978, testified that Nancy said she would not want
to be force fed or kept alive by machines.9 5 Nancy's doctor,
James Davis, testified vividly about her deteriorating vegetative condition, including contorted limbs, red bloated face,
bleeding gums, incontinence, diarrhea, seizures, and vomiting.9 Dr. Davis originally had opposed removing Nancy from
artificial nutrition, but stated that he had changed his belief.
When asked if it was in Nancy's best interests for her to continue in this state, Dr. Davis responded, "No, sir. I think it
would be personally a living hell."'
On December 14, 1990, Judge Teel issued an order authorizing the Cruzans to remove Nancy's feeding tube, stating that
her parents had presented evidence that Nancy would not
want to continue her present hopeless existence. 9 Judge
Teel's decision essentially repeated his findings of three years
seems ironic and inconsistent with the contention by the Missouri Supreme Court that
the state's interest is not in the quality of life but instead is an absolute unqualified
interest in the preservation of life. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 420 (Mo. 1988),
aff'd sub nm. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). The
State's willingness to drop out of the case and allow Nancy to die lends support to
Judge Blackmar's dissent in Cruzan v. Harmon that the state does not in fact have an
absolute interest in the preservation of life. Id. at 428. Judge Blackmar noted that
Missouri's absolutist position is infirm because: 1) the support of capital punishment in
Missouri demonstrates relativist values in which some lives are deemed not worthy of
saving; 2) the Missouri Living Will Statute, used by the court as an expression of
Missouri's policy on the sanctity of life, in fact encourages pre-planned termination of
life through living wills; and 3) the state is not prepared to finance the preservation of
life without regard to cost, resulting in deaths among those who cannot afford medical
treatment. Id. at 428-29.
94. Andrew H. Malcolm, Judge Allows Feeding-Tube Removal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
15, 1990, at 10.
95. Robert Steinbrook, Missouri Court Says Family Can Let Woman Die, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 15, 1990, at Al.
96. Malcolm, supra note 94, at 10.
97. Id.
98. Judge Teel's order stated:
The court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds:
That the intent of our ward, if mentally able, would be to terminate her
nutrition and hydration.
That there is no evidence of substance to cause belief that our ward would
continue her present existence, hopeless as it is, and slowly progressively
worsening.
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earlier except that this time he called the additional evidence
"clear and convincing." 9 Less than two hours after receiving
the decision, Nancy's physician, Dr. Davis, removed the feeding
tube from Nancy's stomach and moved her to a private room
for terminally ill patients in the Missouri Rehabilitation
Center."oo Seven appeals by a loose coalition of anti-euthanasia
and anti-abortion groups' 0 ' to the Missouri Court of Appeals,
Missouri Supreme Court, °2 Missouri Federal District Court, 10 3
and the United States Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals °4 were
dismissed because the groups had no legal standing to intervene. In the early hours of December 26, 1990, eight years
after the car crash, six months after the Supreme Court ruling,
and twelve days after Judge Teel had the final say, Nancy Beth
Cruzan, age thirty-three, died in her sleep peacefully, and
05
apparently, without pain.1

That the co-guardians, Lester L. and Joyce Cruzan, are authorized to cause
the removal of nutrition and hydration from our ward, Nancy Beth Cruzan.
Malcolm, supra note 94, at 10; Steinbrook, supra note 95, at 1 (emphasis added).
99. Malcolm, supra note 94, at 10.
100. Anger in Hospital at a Death Order, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 1990, at 29
[hereinafter Anger in Hospital]. The removal of the tube by Dr. Davis was not
uniformly accepted by all of the staff at the hospital. The director, Don Lamkins,
opposed the judge's order and considered ignoring it, but in the end he felt compelled
to uphold the law. Paul Hendrickson, The Mourning After: In a Small Missouri
Town, the Nancy Cruzan Vigil Ends---The Debate Doesn't, WASH. PoST, Dec. 28, 1990,
at B1. Some of the nurses who had previously cared for Nancy felt that they were
"violated and betrayed" by her family, doctors, and the legal system. Anger in
Hospital,supra,at 29. Although none on the staff were forced to care for Nancy after
the tube was removed, some of the nurses said that they would care for her, but did
not want to be around her family. Id. For a discussion from the point of view of
medical professionals, see C. Everett Koop, Decisions at the End of Life, 5 ISSUES IN L.
& MED. 225 (1989); Irene Prior Loftus, I Have a Conscience, Too: The Plight of Medical
Personnel Confronting the Right to Die, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699 (1990).

101. In addition to filing appeals, some protesters were arrested after attempting
to force their way into Nancy's room to reconnect her feeding tube. 20 ProtestorsHeld
in Bid to Force Feed Right-to-Die Patient, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1990, at P2. Other
protesters held prayer vigils outside the hospital. Nancy Cruzan Dies, Outlived by
Debate Over Right to Die, N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al [hereinafter Nancy Cruzan
Dies].
102. Court Refuses to Order Life Support for Coma Patient, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 20,
1990, at P2. Ironically, the two-sentence order dismissing the appeal to the Missouri
Supreme Court was signed by Judge Edward Robertson, who wrote that court's
decision in Cruzan v. Harmon, denying the family's original request to withdraw
artificial nutrition and hydration. Id.
103. A Federal Judge Scolds Protestorson Filing Petitions in Cruzan Case, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 22, 1990, at 11.

104. Court Refuses to Halt Starvation of Patient,L.A. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1990, at A35.
105. Nancy Cruzan Dies, supra note 101, at Al. In a statement issued by Nancy's
parents, they stated that Nancy "remained peaceful throughout and showed no sign of
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E. Analysis and Criticism of Cruzan

The Cruzan decision has received extensive analysis and
criticism since it was issued.'0° Some commentators have sided
with the majority, supporting its analysis that the right to
refuse medical treatment is less than a fundamental right-a
liberty interest--and that the task of safeguarding that interest
may be entrusted to individual states. Others have sided with
the dissenters in their belief that a fundamental right is at
stake, requiring strict scrutiny analysis. Another approach is
to look beyond that analysis and examine the normative values
underlying the Justices' choices in their majority, concurring,
and dissenting opinions. Those normative values are reflected
by their use of narrative. In other words, one approach to analyzing Cruzan is to look at how the Court's legal narrative
reflects the normative values underlying that story.
1.

Narratives and Nomos

The law derives its authoritative power in part by its ability to analyze a particular set of facts and derive a more
abstract, generalized rule that can be applied to later, similar
sets of facts. But those abstract rules would have no meaning
or justification if they did not reflect our underlying normative
values. As Robert Cover has noted: "We inhabit a nomos-a
normative universe. We constantly create and maintain a
world of right and wrong, of lawful and unlawful, of valid and
discomfort or distress in any way." Id. The cause of her death was listed as "shock,
due to dehydration, due to severe head injury." Steinbrook, supra note 26, at A3.
106. See, e.g., James Bopp, Jr. & Daniel Avila, Perspectives on Cruzan: The
Sirens' Lure of Invented Consent A Critique of Autonomy-Based Surrogate
Decisionmakingfor Legally-IncapacitatedOlder Persons, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 779 (1991);
Norman L. Cantor, Prospective Autonomy: On the Limits of Shaping One's
Postcompetence Medical Fate, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTHI L. & POL'Y 13 (1992); William L.
Leschensky, Constitutional Protection of the "Refusal-of-Treatment's Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Department of Health, 14 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 248 (1991);
Susan R. Martyn & Henry J. Bourguignon, Perspectives on Cruzan. Coming to Terms
with Death: The Cruzan Case, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 817 (1991); Thomas J. Onusko &
Patricia Casey Cuthbertson, The Right to Refuse Medical Treatment in Ohio After
Cruzan: The Need for a Comprehensive Legislative Solution, 5 J.L. & HEALTH 35
(1990-91); George P. Smith II, Murder, She Wrote or Was It Merely Selective
Nontreatment?, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 49 (1992); Tom Stacy, Death,
Privacy and the Free Exercise of Religion, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 490 (1992); Ben A.
Rich, The Assault on Privacy On Healthcare Decisionmaking,68 DENV. U. L. REV. 1
(1991); Anne Marie Gaudin, Note, Cruzan v. Director Missouri Departmentof Health:
To Die or Not To Die: That is the Question-But Who Decides?, 51 LA. L. REv. 1307
(1991); Edward J. O'Brien, Note, Refusing Life-Sustaining Treatment Can We Just
Say No?, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 677 (1992).
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void."' 1 One of the most powerful means by which the law
reflects those values and gives meaning to abstract rules is
through its use of narrative or storytelling. The attraction of
narratives is that they correspond more closely "to the manner
in which the human mind makes sense of experience than does
the conventional, abstracted rhetoric of law."'' 8 Narratives,
with their fuller, more concrete meanings, provide a link
between generalized rules and the normative values that they
reflect."°
Judicial opinions take conflicting stories presented by the
opposing parties and fashion from them a legal narrative, the
court's version of the story. Of course, no story can include all
the details, or, for that matter, determine every aspect of the
truth-of what actually happened. And to some extent, no one
"truth" may exist. Often parties with conflicting versions of
events are each convinced that their version is right. Once that
story is framed in a legal narrative, however, it becomes the
official version of what happened. The power of a legal narrative, then, lies partly in its ability to satisfy the parties and the
community at large with that official version of what happened
and with the normative values that it reflects. However, part
of its persuasive power also lies in its ability to address the normative values at stake in the broader cultural narrative of
which the legal narrative is only a part.
2.

Cruzan: The Failure of Narrative

In Cruzan, the legal narrative is a story about a young
woman who sustained severe injuries in an automobile accident, which left her in a persistent vegetative state. But
Cruzan is also about a broader cultural narrative. It is about
the process of dying and about the freedom of individuals and
their families to make choices about that process. One disturbing aspect of Rehnquist's opinion is that his version of
Nancy's story fails to adequately embrace that broader cultural
narrative or give thoughtful consideration to its conflicting
normative values. His dismissive attitude of the values
explored by the dissenting opinions fails to acknowledge how
107. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forward: Nomos and
Narrative,97 HARv. L. REV. 4 (1983).
108. Steven Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon Between Legal Power
and NarrativeMeaning, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2225, 2228 (1989).
109. Id.

See also JAMES BOYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON THE RHETORIC

AND POETICS OF THE LAW 168 (1985).
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the normative values within the broader cultural narrative are
changing. As a result, his opinion has a narrowness, a sort of
brittleness, that makes it ill-suited to assist the thousands of
people who will find themselves or their family members in
the same situation as Nancy Cruzan.
In Rehnquist's narrowing and shaping of the legal narrative, much is left out. Most of the emotional content of the
narrative is lost: the anguish of Nancy's family and friends,
and of the hospital nurses, doctors, and administrators, all of
whom must cope with their emotional response to Nancy's condition and their personal feelings about when life ends and
death begins. The legal narrative focuses very narrowly on
Nancy's situation and even downplays that situation. For
example, the Court's choice of language describes her story in
a perfunctory manner and relegates to a footnote the detailed
description of her persistent vegetative state. Although the
Court notes that she is legally an incompetent, the tone of the
legal narrative gives the impression that she is a cognitive,
competent adult asking to commit suicide by starving herself
to death. The Court thus treats her situation the same as a
person asking for the right to jump off a bridge or to go on a
hunger strike.
Certainly, in a case, a Court is presented with only one set
of facts, and to an extent, the Court should address only those
facts briefed. But when the Court is construing a possible Constitutional right, the effects of that decision will ripple far
beyond the facts of that one case into the broader cultural narrative. In Cruzan, the Court fails to acknowledge this effect.
But even if the Court does acknowledge this effect, it draws little distinction between the infinitely varied situations in which
a person may be confronted with the process of dying.
In contrast, the two dissenting narratives of Justices Brennan and Stevens go into great detail about Nancy's condition,
concluding that she is in a "twilight zone of suspended animation where death commences while life, in some form, continues.""' Moreover, both legal narratives broaden their stories
to include the cultural narrative beyond Nancy's individual situation. Cruzan is not an isolated or unusual case; many
110. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting). See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 741 P.2d 674, 678 (Ariz. 1987);
Daniel D. King et al., Where Death Begins While Life Continues, 31 S. TEX. L. J. 145,
146 (1990).
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thousands of people are in situations similar to hers. As Justice Brennan notes, of those who die each year in this country,
most will die in hospitals or long-term care facilities and many
of those after a decision to forego life-sustaining treatment is
made.1 11 Thus, the Court's decision has a much broader ramification than the wording of the majority decision would seem to
acknowledge.
Another disturbing feature of the majority's legal narrative is that it ignores much of the factual evidence about
Nancy's intentions regarding removal of life-support treatment. The only evidence that the Court includes in its narrative is a "somewhat serious conversation with a housemate
friend that if sick or injured [Nancy] would not wish to continue her life unless she could live at least halfway normally.""' 2 In the Court's eyes, such an off-the-cuff statement is
unreliable for purposes of determining Nancy's intent. The
Court concludes that this evidence is insufficient to meet the
clear and convincing evidence standard. The trial court, however, concluded that the evidence was sufficient, a conclusion
based on a great deal of testimony in addition to this "somewhat serious conversation." Besides her friend's testimony
about their conversations, Nancy's sister, mother, and another
friend testified about Nancy's wishes regarding artificial life13

support."

3.

The Failure of Narrative to Reflect Nomos

The Court does acknowledge several normative values
underlying its legal narrative. In that narrative, the Court
frames the issue as whether the United States Constitution
forbids Missouri from establishing a procedural rule that
requires clear and convincing evidence of a patient's intent
about withdrawing treatment. According to the Court, the
normative value underlying this high evidentiary rule is the
protection of the individual's intent. In other words, the Court
wants to protect Nancy's choice and ensure that her intent is
accurately determined and effectuated. But if the normative
value that the Supreme Court wished to advance was truly
protecting the intent of the individual, why did the Court
ignore much of the factual evidence in its legal narrative?
111. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2846.
113. See supra notes 36, 43-45 and accompanying text.
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Why did it impose a markedly asymmetrical evidentiary burden that discounted much of that evidence? Certainly the
state has a legitimate interest as parens patriae in providing
Nancy, as an incompetent, with "as accurate as possible a
determination of how she would exercise her rights under
'
these circumstances." 114

Once the individual's intent to con-

tinue treatment has been determined, the state may assert a
legitimate interest in providing that treatment. It seems likely
that most people in Nancy Cruzan's situation would want their
families, friends, and doctors to determine carefully their
intent regarding treatment and carry out that intent. But
before the state can assert an interest in providing treatment
according to the individual's choice, the only state interest that
may be advanced is safe-guarding the accuracy of that determination. Therefore, as Justice Brennan notes, accuracy should
be the touchstone of the Court's proceeding. Yet the Court
ignored much of the evidence that would seemingly go to the
heart of an accurate determination of Nancy's intent. What
was really going on in this opinion?
Ultimately, one is forced to conclude that the Justices
were disingenuous. Although they pay lip-service to the normative value of protecting Nancy's choice, the Court was really
promoting another normative value: the state's interest in preserving human life. Certainly this interest is a legitimate normative value. One of our country's core values is a belief in
the value of human life, and one of the state's key roles is protecting the lives of its citizens. The state demonstrates that
commitment to life by treating homicide as a serious crime and
passing laws against suicide. But is Cruzan truly about suicide,
as Justice Scalia would have us believe in his concurring opinion? The Court acts as if Nancy's case is the same as a competent adult who decides one day to starve herself,11 5 but are
those cases really the same? Probably not.
The problem is that, in lumping all these cases together
and asserting an unqualified interest in preserving life, the
Court begs the ultimate question: What is life? According to
the Court, in the face of doubt about Nancy's intent, the Court
errs on the side of "life." The Court notes that an erroneous
decision not to terminate results in maintenance of the status
114. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
115. A state need not "remain neutral in the face of an informed and voluntary
decision by a physically-able adult to starve to death." Id. at 2852.
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quo, whereas an erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment "is not susceptible of correction"-the patient has
died.1 16 Certainly Nancy was "alive" in a physiological sense at
the time of the Court's decision, but was her situation "life" as
we know it, accept it, or want it to be defined? The Court
chooses to view this issue as a judgment about "quality" of life
and responds that a state may decline to make such judgments
and simply assert an unqualified interest in the preservation of
human life. But by asserting that unqualified interest and by
keeping Nancy on life-support, the Court is in fact making an
unstated conclusion that life equals biological persistence. As
Justice Stevens notes,
for patients like Nancy Cruzan, who have no consciousness
and no chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to
whether the mere persistence of their bodies is "life" as that
word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. The
State's unflagging determination to perpetuate Nancy
Cruzan's physical existence is comprehensible only as an
effort to define
life's meaning, not as an attempt to preserve
1 17
its sanctity.
This definition of life is disturbing. Not only does it fail to
provide any guidance in situations similar-or different-from
Cruzan's, but it dooms thousands to become prisoners of every
advance in medical science or technology. At the heart of this
concern lies another normative value rejected by the majority:
the individual's right to self-determination. In this country,
our ideas of physical freedom and self-determination are inextricably entwined with our notions of liberty. "The duty of the
State to preserve life must encompass a recognition of an individual's right to avoid circumstances in which the individual
himself would feel that efforts to sustain life demean or
degrade his humanity. '118 Medical decisions should be guided
by the individual patient's interests and values. "Allowing persons to determine their own medical treatment is an important
way in which society respects persons as individuals."11 9
This normative value, which is embraced by the Cruzan
dissent, is in tension with the majority's normative value, the
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 2854.
Id. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
Id. at 2868 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Cruszan, 110 S. Ct. at 2876 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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State's interest in preserving life. In the majority's legal narrative, the State's interest prevails. Unless people's intent about
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment is clear and convincing-a burden that can likely be met in only a small minority
of cases-most will have no choice in determining their fate.
They will be forced to accept the Court's definition of life as
biological persistence, subject to the "constantly increasing
power of science to keep the human body alive for longer than
any reasonable person would want to inhabit it."' 2 ° By adopting this normative value of preserving life at all costs, the
Court evinces a disdain for individuals' right to choose and
transforms them into passive subjects of medical technology.
This result is unacceptable. The majority's normative
value, with its definition of life as biological persistence, seems
to be an old-fashioned view of life and death that fails to provide any guidance to our modern technological society. The
majority clings to the old notion that death should be beyond
human choice, decided by fate when the body can no longer
sustain itself. That notion, however, no longer accurately
reflects medical reality. Whereas the timing of death was once
a matter of fate, it is now often a matter of choice.' 2 1 Moreover, one is suspicious that the majority is trying to impose on
society its own Judeo-Christian religious view of life-and-death
decisions.
For example in his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia goes
into great detail about the history of suicide. He notes that in
Blackstone and old common law cases suicide was considered
criminally liable:
The life of those to whom life has become a burden-of
those who are hopelessly diseased or fatally wounded-nay
even the lives of criminals condemned to death, are under
the protection of the law, equally as the lives of those who
are in the full tide of life's enjoyment, and anxious to con22
tinue to live.'
Scalia uses this historical analysis as evidence that suicide was
never "so rooted in our tradition that it may be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' "123
120.
121.
122.
146, 163
123.

Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring).
Id. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting Blackburn v. State, 23 Ohio St.
(1873)).
Id. at 2860 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Thomas J. Marzen et al., Suicide: A
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Therefore, to Scalia, Nancy Cruzan has no basis for claiming a
fundamental right to remove life-support. However, he uses
Blackstone and cases from the 1800's when medical technology
was vastly different than today. Furthermore, he merely cites
the common law of 1800 as support without ever examining
the normative values underlying that law or how those values
are changing. Scalia seems to forget that the common law is,
in essence, an embodiment of the societal values by which the
community wants to be governed. In the 1800's, those values
had strong religious overtones, reflecting the predominant
view that suicide was a sin against God and that human beings
must persevere on this mortal plain until God chooses to take
them away. But those values are changing, in part because of
changes in medical technology that have blurred the line
between life and death, and in part because of the splintering
of society's religious views. Nevertheless, for the Justices to
incorporate their own religious view of the definition of life
into constitutional decision-making is unprincipled. As Justice
Stevens commented,
it would be possible to hypothesize such [a state interest in
defining and preserving life) on the basis of theological or
philosophical conjecture. But even to posit such a basis for
the State's action is to condemn it. It is not within the prov-

ince of secular government to circumscribe the liberties of
the people by regulations designed wholly for the purpose of
1 24
establishing a sectarian definition of life.

The ultimate problem with the majority's normative value
is two-fold:

(1) it does not acknowledge that society's views

about preserving life are changing, and (2) it fails to provide
any framework for accommodating that change. Rather, the
predominant normative value in the broader cultural narrative
today is that of individual self-determination, and more specifically, the right of the individual to chose when life is no longer
worth living. Of course, even this statement is too black-andwhite; people are much less comfortable with the Kevorkian
death-machine than with the notion of allowing a terminally
ill, comatose person to die by stopping artificial life-support
when no chance of recovery exists.
Nevertheless, who are we to say what a person's choice
ConstitutionalRight?, 24 DuQ. L. REv. 1, 76 (1985) (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 325 (1937))).
124. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2888 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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should or should not be if confronted with a situation such as
Nancy Cruzan's? What state's interest can justify the government intruding into some of the most personal and profound
choices facing a person or their family and friends? Certainly
the State serves a role in protecting life and should safe-guard
our society's normative value that life is precious. The law
should never become a vehicle reflecting disdain for life, where
it would be a routine matter to say, "Oh, Uncle is failing, and
we can't afford the hospital bills, so let's just pull the plug."
To the extent that the law serves a role in preserving our attitudes about the sanctity of life, it should continue to serve that
function. But as Justice Stevens notes,
the only apparent secular basis for the State's interest in life
is the policy's persuasive impact upon people other than
Nancy and her family. Yet, "[a]ithough the State may properly perform a teaching function," and although that teaching may foster respect for the sanctity of life, the State may
not pursue its project by infringing constitutionally protected interests for "symbolic effect."'
Cruzan sends a symbolic message about the sanctity of life, but
at the expense of the individual's choice about that life.
By embracing only the normative value of preserving life,
without adequately addressing the conflicting value of selfdetermination, the majority's legal narrative fails to reflect the
tension of these changing normative values or provide any
flexibility for dealing with the thousands of situations like
Nancy Cruzan's that will arise each year. Thus, the Court's
opinion is too rigid and brittle; it is like a crystal that captures
and attempts to hold onto old normative values to prevent
them from changing. But if a "word is not a crystal," neither is
the law a crystal, "transparent and unchanged." Rather, as
Justice Holmes noted, it is the "skin of a living thought, varying greatly in color and content according to the circumstances
and the time in which it is used."' 6 If legal narratives are in
fact normative, then for that narrative to be embraced by society, it must adequately reflect those normative values underlying those "living thoughts"-the values and standards by
which our society wants to be governed. Certainly the law has
an inherent tension as both a guardian for preserving our cul125. Id. at 2889 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Carey v. Population Services
Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977)) (emphasis in original).
126. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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tural values and a vehicle by which those values change. But
when the law ceases to provide a flexible mechanism for
reflecting those changing values and only holds on to preserving old values, the law becomes as brittle as Holmes' crystal.
This result suggests a further danger. When a legal narrative fails to reflect the normative values of its larger cultural
narrative, people sense this failure and will not accept its
result. In other words, the opinion fails to have weight within
the community that it seeks to govern. For example, in
Cruzan, because the legal narrative was inadequate, it was not
accepted by much of its community as authoritative. In particular, the Cruzan family refused to accept the result of the
Court and found additional evidence to take back to the trial
court judge, who originally ruled in their favor. Based on this
new evidence, the trial court held that the evidence was now
clear and convincing, and granted the family's petition.
If the legal narrative in a case such as Cruzan is inadequate, it undermines the power of the court to speak authoritatively and resolve disputes according to a consensus of
community values. Of course, the failure of legal narratives
may motivate people to change the law legislatively, thereby
better reflecting the community's values. On the other hand,
people may become disenchanted, jaded. They may begin to
view the law as not representative of their values and ignore
those laws, or believe that "the system" does not work. Such a
result undermines the ability of the law to provide an authoritative resolution as people begin to circumvent or ignore the
law.
In conclusion, the Cruzan legal narrative is unsatisfactory.
It fails to address adequately all the facts of its own narrative,
the broader cultural narrative, or the normative values at
stake in such a case. To the extent that our culture has not
resolved these conflicting normative values, perhaps the law
cannot not resolve them either. But the law should reflect
that tension, and if it is not resolvable, then leave that resolution to the individual and her family. Ultimately, the Rehnquist narrative leaves many readers angry. They are angered
because the Court fails to take seriously the enormity of a situation in which a person wants to make choices about life and
death in private with some semblance of dignity. Finally, the
Court fails to provide a framework for effectuating those
choices.
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F.

The Effect of Cruzan

The above criticisms focused on the failure of the Cruzan
narrative to provide a flexible legal framework that adequately
reflects the conflicting normative values of our society. But
beyond this failure, what impact does the decision have on the
state's ability to provide such a framework on its own accord?
To some extent, the effect of the Cruzan decision is uncertain
because the decision appears to be a narrow holding limited to
Missouri law. The Court held that Missouri's rule of decision
requiring a clear and convincing evidentiary standard did not
violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, Cruzan does have broad implications that may
have a significant impact on every state, including Washington.
In Cruzan, the United States- Supreme Court acknowledged for the first time that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment. 1 27 Because of Cruzan, people now have a constitutional due process right to refuse medical treatment. More
importantly, that protected liberty interest encompasses a
right to refuse artificially delivered food and water. Justice
O'Connor, in her concurring opinion, noted that "artificial
feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of
medical treatment.'

1

28

Another important development is the Court's acknowledgment that a state could allow a person's right to refuse
medical treatment to be exercised by a surrogate on behalf of
the now-incompetent person. Certainly the Cruzans and many
groups such as the Society for the Right to Die would have
preferred the Court find that the Due Process Clause required
a state to give effect to the decisions of a patient's duly
appointed surrogate decisionmaker. 1 29 Just as important, however, the Court did not block the development of state laws to
deal with situations such as Nancy Cruzan's. In fact, the
Court's decision allows each state to develop its own approach
for protecting an incompetent person's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment. 30 As Justice O'Connor pointed out in
127. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.

128. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 79-81.
130. The Chief Judge of the State of New York noted that the actual holding of
Cruzan may be narrow, but the message is clear: "This is an area in which the Court

intends to defer to the states. In other words: Don't call us, we'll call you."

Sol
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her concurrence, "the more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States."''
Thus, the importance of Cruzan to states such as Washington is two-fold: First, the case finds a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment,
including artificial hydration and nutrition. Second, the case
allows each state to develop its own approach for protecting
that liberty interest. However, before we can explore these
implications in detail and assess the direct efffect of Cruzan on
Washington state, we must first examine the current status of
Washington law.
III.

A.

WASHINGTON STATE LAW

The Natural Death Act

In Cruzan, the first area of state law to which the United
States Supreme Court turned for guidance was Missouri's Living Will Statute, which the Court found to reflect that state's
strong interest in life. Washington, like Missouri, has a living
will statute.
In the 1970's, Washington, like many states, began to recognize the dilemma created by advances in medical science
that increasingly blur the line between life and death. State
legislatures responded by passing so-called living will statutes,
under which an adult could execute a directive that would
require the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures under certain conditions. In 1979, Washington passed its
version of a living will statute, the Natural Death Act
(NDA).' 3 2 In 1992, the Washington legislature amended the
NDA 3 3 in response to a statewide referendum proposing
numerous changes to the NDA.134 Despite the amendments to
Wachtler, Life and Death Decisions: The Patient's Choice, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 23, 1991, at
39.
131. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2859 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
132. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.122 (1989).
133. 1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE ch. 70.122).
134. Citizens' Initiative Measure No. 119, a state-wide referendum proposing
extensive changes to the NDA, appeared on the general ballot in November 1991.
Some of the initiative's provisions that would clarify language, such as refusing
artificial nutrition and hydration, were generally supported by the health care
community. Lou Cannon, Assisted Killing of Fatally 1l1 on State Ballot-Wash.
Measure Spurs Intense Debate, WASH. POST, Nov. 3, 1991, at A6; Robert O'Boyle, Life
and Death Look A Lot Different Now, THE SEATrLE TIMES, Oct. 27, 1991, at K3.
However, other language, called "aid-in-dying," would specifically allow a competent,
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the statute, however, the NDA still only applies to a person
who has executed a written directive indicating her preferred
course of medical treatment. Thus, the NDA does not directly
apply to the thousands of people like Nancy Cruzan who have
not executed a living will. Nevertheless, the changes to the
NDA do help to clarify Washington state's underlying policy
on the use of artificial nutrition and hydration for people in a
persistent vegetative state.
In the NDA, the legislature stated that adult persons have
a fundamental right to control decisions relating to their
health care, including a decision to withhold or withdraw lifesustaining treatment in instances of a terminal condition or
permanent unconscious condition.'3 5 Because medical technology may now artificially prolong life beyond its natural limits,
such prolonging may cause a person suffering from a terminal
or permanent unconscious condition to lose personal dignity or
undergo unnecessary pain and suffering. Yet such treatment
provides "nothing medically necessary or beneficial to the
patient."' 36 In the interest of protecting individual autonomy,
dignity, and privacy, the legislature passed the Natural Death
Act. Under the NDA, an adult with the capacity to make
health care decisions has the right to execute a written directive, which would require the withholding or withdrawal of
life-sustaining treatment in the event of a terminal or permanent unconscious condition. 3 7
conscious patient to request medical aid by a physician to end the patient's life. See
Wash. Initiative Measure No. 119 (on file with the University of Puget Sound Law
Review). This controversial aid-in-dying provision would authorize what to some had

previously been considered euthanasia and statutorily defined as homicide. Strong
opposition to the aid-in-dying provision by some members of the health care
community and by the Catholic archdiocese resulted in defeat of the referendum. To
persuade voters to defeat the initiative, the archdiocese promised to support legislative
amendments to the NDA that would include the initiative's less-controversial language
clarifications. These amendments had previously been proposed in the legislature but
defeated partly because of the Catholic archdiocese's opposition. Natural Death Act
Gives Patients Right to Decide on Feeding Tubes, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 8, 1992, at
A14 [hereinafter Natural Death Act]; Senate GOP Majority Kills House-Ok'd Right-toDie Bill, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 4, 1992, at B4; see Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill

(ESSB) 3228, 49th Leg., 1985 Reg. Sess.; ESSB 5401, 50th Leg., 1987 Reg. Sess.; H.B.
1965, 50th Leg., 1988 Reg. Sess. The archdiocese kept its promise to support the

amendments, which resulted in the passage of S.H.B. 1481 by the legislature on March
5, 1992. See 1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98; Natural Death Act, supra, at A14.

135. 1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98, § 1.
136. Id.
137. The revised NDA states:
In recognition of the dignity and privacy which patients have a right to expect,

the legislature hereby declares that the laws of the state of Washington shall

284

University of Puget Sound Law Review

[Vol. 16:249

A Washington court confronted with a case such as
Cruzan's might turn to the NDA for guidance, just as the Missouri and United States Supreme Courts turned to the Missouri Living Will Statute in Cruzan. The Missouri Living Will
Statute specifically excluded artificial nutrition and hydration
from the list of procedures that could be withdrawn in accordance with a living will. From that exclusion, the Missouri and
United States Supreme Courts inferred a policy in favor of the
preservation of life. Unlike Missouri, however, the 1992 revisions to the Washington NDA added "artificially provided
nutrition and hydration" to the "life-sustaining treatment"'13
that may be withheld or withdrawn from a person under certain conditions. The revised NDA also clarified those conditions under which artificial nutrition and hydration could be
removed. Whereas the statute previously allowed removal
only when the person was in a "terminal condition,"' 3 9 the
revised NDA now allows removal when the patient is in a
"permanent unconscious condition,"' 4 ° including an "irreversrecognize the right of an adult person to make a written directive instructing
such person's physician to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment in
the event of a terminal condition or permanent unconscious condition.
Id.
138. Id. § 2(5). The revisions change the term "life-sustaining procedure" to "lifesustaining treatment." Id. Changes to the definition are interesting, deletions from
the definition are indicated below in brackets and new language is indicated in italics:
"Life-sustaining [procedure] treatment' means any medical or surgical
[procedure or intervention which utilizes] intervention that uses mechanical
or other artificial means, including artifuially provided nutrition and
hydration, to sustain, restore, or [supplant] replace a vital function, which,
when applied to a qualified patient, would serve only to [artificially] prolong
the [moment of death and where, in the judgment of the attending physician,
death is imminent whether or not such procedures are utilized] process of
dying. "Life-sustaining [procedure] treatment" shall not include the
administration of medication or the performance of any medical [procedure]
or surgical intervention deemed necessary solely to alleviate pain.
Id.
139. The legislature also clarified the definition of "terminal condition." Deletions
from the definition are indicated by brackets and additions are indicated by italics:
"Terminal condition" means an incurable and irreversiblecondition caused by
injury, disease, or illness, [which, regardless of the application of life
sustaining procedures, would] that, within reasonable medical judgment,
[produce] will cause death within a reasonableperiod of time in accordance
with accepted medical standards,and where the application of life-sustaining
[procedures] treatment serves only to [postpone the moment of death of the
patient] prolong the process of dying.
1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98, § 2(9).
140. The revised NDA defines "permanent unconscious condition" as "an
incurable and irreversible condition in which the patient is medically assessed within
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ible coma" or a "persistent vegetative state."1 4 1
Moreover, the new revisions to the Washington NDA
reflect a change in policy underlying the NDA. Unlike the
Missouri Living Will Statute, which evinced a policy to preserve life at all costs, the Washington State Legislature's 1992
revisions specifically changed the NDA's language from the
"prolongation of life" to the "prolongation of the process of
dying. '142 Although the shift in emphasizing prolonging "life"
to the "process of dying" may only be one of semantics, it
arguably denotes a policy shift reflecting competing normative
values. By using the term "prolongation of life," such as in the
Missouri statute, the legislature reflects a normative value in
which life is viewed as precious, and doctors should use
whatever measures necessary to preserve that life at all costs.
The language "process of dying" does not challenge that normative value about life. Instead, it reflects the realization that
all life eventually ends and that health care professionals have
a competing normative value to ease the patient's suffering and
allow the process to run its course when prolonging it will not
be beneficial to the patient. Significantly, the legislature added
language to support this competing normative value. In the
language immediately following the discussion of "the process
of dying," the legislature instructs that "physicians and nurses
should not withhold or unreasonably diminish pain medication
for patients in a terminal condition where the primary intent
of providing such medication is to alleviate pain and maintain
or increase the patient's comfort."' 4 3
Several key provisions of the NDA, however, limit its
applicability to many situations such as that of Nancy Cruzan.
First, the person must actually execute a written directive stating her intentions before the terminal or permanent unconscious condition ensues.'" Nancy Cruzan, like the vast
reasonable medical judgment as having no reasonable probability of recovery from an

irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state." Id. § 2(6).
141. Although the revised NDA does not define "irreversible coma" or "persistent

vegetative state," a patient suffering from those conditions is not "qualified" for
removal of life-sustaining treatment unless two physicians diagnose in writing that the

patient is in a permanent unconscious condition "in accordance with accepted medical
standards."

Id. § 2(8). One physician must be the patient's attending physician, and

both must have personally examined the patient. Id
142. Id.

§ 1; see also § 2(5), in which "moment of death" is redefined as the

"process of dying."
143. 1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98, § 1.
144. Id. § 1, 3 (to be codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 70.122.010, -. 030).
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majority of Americans, had not executed such a directive prior
to entering a persistent vegetative state; in fact, the statute did
not even exist at the time of her accident. Thus, in her case,
the Missouri Living Will Statute was not directly applicable.
Likewise, the Natural Death Act would not be applicable to a
person in Nancy Cruzan's situation in Washington because the
Act only covers people who have executed a written directive
before becoming incompetent.
Not only must the person have executed a written living
will, but that person must also be an "adult," one who has
attained the age of majority and who has the capacity to make
health care decisions. 1 45 Thus, the Washington NDA would
not cover situations involving minors suffering from a persistent vegetative state. 146 Likewise, the statute would not provide for individuals, regardless of their age, who do not have
the capacity to make health care decisions. This exception
would apply to individuals like Nancy Cruzan who did not execute a living will before she suffered injury in the car accident
and no longer had the capacity to make her own health care
decisions afterwards. This exception would also apply to those
disabled individuals who have never had the capacity to make
1 47
health care decisions.
The Act does add language that a person's right to control
his or her health care may be exercised by an authorized representative holding that person's durable power of attorney for
health care. 14 ' Again, the person must have executed a written
durable power of attorney; many people, especially young
adults like Nancy Cruzan who do not anticipate injury in a car
accident, will not have taken that action. Furthermore, the
statute only authorizes the representative to exercise the
health care choices of the person as indicated in the written
directive drafted according to the NDA.
In conclusion, the Washington Natural Death Act, unlike
the Missouri Living Will Statute, evinces a policy that artificial
nutrition and hydration are life-sustaining treatments that may
be withdrawn fram individuals suffering from a persistant
vegitative state. Nevertheless, the Washington statute, like the
Missouri law, would not be applicable to a person in Nancy
145. Id. § 1, 2(1).
146. See In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).

147. See In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
148. 1992 Wash. Laws ch. 98, §§ 1, 3(l)(b).

Life And Death After Cruzan

1992]

287

Cruzan's situation because the NDA only covers people who
have executed a written directive before becoming incompetent. Thus, a Washington court deciding a case like Cruzan
must turn to common law solutions for cases not covered by
the Natural Death Act.
B.

Common Law Solutions: Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant.14 9

In a series of cases decided before Cruzan, the Washington
Supreme Court dealt with situations similar to that of Nancy

Cruzan.
1. In re Colyer
The first case, In re Colyer,15° was one of first impression
in Washington that addressed the issue of an incompetent's
right to have life-sustaining treatment withheld or withdrawn
in appropriate circumstances. The case dealt with the plight of
Bertha Colyer, who suffered a heart attack at age sixty-nine.
Like Nancy Cruzan, Bertha was deprived of oxygen for
approximately ten minutes, which resulted in massive brain
damage. Afterwards, Bertha could only breathe with the
assistance of a respirator and remained in a persistent vegetative state, with zero prognosis for recovery to "any sort of
meaningful existence."' 15 Bertha's husband, as guardian over
Bertha's person and estate, petitioned the court for authorization to remove her life support systems. The court appointed a
guardian ad litem to represent Bertha's interests.1 1 2 The trial
149. For additional discussion of these cases, see Jacquelyn A. Beatty, Comment,

Artiftcial Nutrition and the Terminally 1k How Should Washington Decide?, 61
WASH. L. REV. 419 (1986); Stephen P. VanDerhoef, Note, In re Grant: Where Does
Washington Stand On Artificial Nutrition and Hydration?, 13 U. PUGET SOUND L.

REv. 197 (1989).
150. 99 Wash. 2d 114, 660 P.2d 738 (1983).
151. Id. at 116, 660 P.2d at 740. The court does not define "meaningful existence,"
but goes on to describe Bertha's condition as follows:
Weeks elapsed without any signs of neurological improvement or lightening of
her coma. Two physicians, a cardiologist and a neurologist, agreed that the
likelihood of Bertha Colyer recovering any significant amount of brain
function was extremely small. They also agreed that she would probably
expire within a short period if removed from the respirator. Even their most
optimistic prognosis was that she might be able to breathe on her own, but

would persist in a very infantile state, unable to speak or communicate and
requiring maintenance of all bodily functions.
Id.
152. Under Washington law, a guardian ad litem is appointed under various
circumstances to represent and protect the interests of the incompetent person, thus
providing an important safeguard function. For example, when a petition has been
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court granted the husband's request, and the Washington
Supreme Court affirmed. The court held that an incurably and
terminally ill adult has a constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment that only prolongs the dying process, absent
countervailing state interests. 5 3 A guardian, exercising his best
judgment M4 that the patient, if competent, would choose to
filed to appoint a guardian for an incompetent, the court will first appoint a guardian
ad litem to represent the best interests of the incompetent until a permanent guardian
is appointed. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.090 (1989). The guardian ad litem must be a
person "free of influence from anyone interested in the result of the proceeding." Id.
§ 11.88.090(2)(a). While a guardianship petition is pending, the guardian ad litem has
authority to consent to emergency lifesaving medical procedures for the incompetent.
Id § 11.88.090(5). Once a permanent guardian has been appointed, authority to act on
the incompetent's behalf shifts to the guardian, and the guardian ad litem is dismissed.
See id. § 11.88.090(6). The guardian then has the power "to care for and maintain the
incompetent or disabled person, assert his or her rights and best interests, and provide
timely, informed consent to necessary medical procedures." Id. § 11.92.043(4)-(5)
(Supp. 1992).
However, if judicial intervention is subsequently required to resolve a dispute
regarding life sustaining treatment decisions, a guardian ad litem would again be
appointed to protect the best interests of the incompetent during that proceeding.
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 136-37, 660 P.2d at 750. According to the Colyer court, the
guardian's function in this context is to discover and present to the court all the facts
relevant to the decision to withdraw life sustaining treatment. Such facts would
include, but are not limited to:
(a) facts about the incompetent: i.e., age, cause of incompetency, relationship
with family members and other close friends, attitude and prior statements
concerning life sustaining treatment; (b) medical facts: i.e., prognosis for
recovery, intrusiveness of treatment, medical history; (c) facts concerning the
state's interest in preserving life: i.e., the existence of dependents, other third
party interests; and (d) facts about the guardian, the family, and the
petitioner: i.e., their familiarity with the incompetent, their perceptions of the
incompetent's wishes, any potential for ill motives. Thus, the guardian ad
litem would not necessarily play a true adversarial role, but would serve as an
investigator and a reporter of relevant facts to the court.
Id. at 133, 660 P.2d at 748-49. For a comparison of the guardian ad litem's role in other
jurisdictions requiring routine judicial intervention in the substantive decision making
process, see, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977); Charles H. Baron, Assuring "Detached But PassionateInvestigation
and Decision": The Role of GuardiansAd Litem in Saikewicz-type Cases, 4 AM.J.L. &
MED. 111 (1978).
153. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d. at 120, 660 P.2d at 742. The usual four countervailing
state interests were cited. For a discussion of these interests, see infra note 163 and
accompanying text.
154. Under the guardianship statute, a guardian has a duty to assert the "rights
and best interests" of the incompetent person. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.92.040(3) (1989).
See supra note 152. This treatment may be different from the "best-interests" test
used by some courts to decide if treatment should be withdrawn when the patient's
intent cannot be determined. See supra note 70. The Colyer court uses the
"substituted judgment" test, but takes a less stringent, more realistic approach than
some courts. Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra note 70, at 391. In Colyer, the proxy
simply exercises her best judgment about whether the patient would want treatment
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remove treatment, could assert that patient's right to refuse
such treatment.

155

The court noted that the Washington Natural Death Act
was not applicable, but as with the Missouri statute in Cruzan,
the Act established a general policy that served as the foundation for the court's holding. The court cited the legislative
findings from the Act, which acknowledged a person's right to
control medical decisions and the right to privacy as grounds
for withholding treatment.'15
In addition to the policy behind the NDA, the court found
a constitutional and common law basis for a right to refuse lifesustaining procedures. According to the court, this right flows
from a constitutional right to privacy, as identified by the
United States Supreme Court in the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights,' 57 and as specifically guaranteed in the Washington
State Constitution.' 58 An alternative basis for the right to
refuse life-sustaining procedures is the common law right to be
free from bodily invasion.'5 9 The court noted that, historically,
medical treatment without patient consent constituted battery
and malpractice.' 6° This common law right led to the doctrine
of informed consent, which encompassed the right to refuse
consent
to medical
treatment,
including
life-saving
procedures.' 6 '
Acknowledging that a right to refuse treatment is not
absolute, the court stated that the right must be balanced by
the state's interest in protecting the sanctity of its citizens'
lives.' 62 Courts have usually identified four state interests: (1)
the preservation of life, (2) protection of innocent third parties
withheld. Id. Subsequently, in the Grant decision, the court clarifies that if the proxy
cannot determine the patient's intent, a "best-interests" test may then be used to
determine the best treatment choice for the patient. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545,

567-68, 747 P.2d 445, 456-57 (1987).
155. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 127-28, 660 P.2d at 746.
156. Id. at 119, 660 P.2d at 741.
157. Id. at 119-20, 660 P.2d at 741 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v.

Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 213 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); and Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (freedom to care for one's health and person falls within the
purview of the right of privacy)).
158. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law").

159.
160.
P.2d 568
161.
162.

Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d. at 121, 660 P.2d at 743.
Id; see Physicians' & Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wash. 2d 38, 111
(1941).
Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 121-22, 660 P.2d at 743.
Id. at 122; 660 P.2d at 743.
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such as children, (3) prevention of suicide, and (4) maintenance
Of the
of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.'
interest
is
the
preservation
of life,
four, the most significant
which has prevailed over the individual's rights in cases where
life-sustaining treatment could save the life of a nonconsenting
patient.TM On the other hand, when lifesaving treatment only
prolongs a life inflicted with an incurable condition, this state
interest weakens considerably.-' If the condition is hopeless,
or if there is "no reasonable possibility of returning to a cognitive, sapient state," the patient's privacy rights outweigh the
state's interest in preserving life.'
Applying a balancing test, the court compared the degree
of bodily invasion under such circumstances to the state's
interest in life. 67 Bertha required a respirator, intravenous
feeding equipment, a catheter, and intensive nursing care,
which the court found to be extremely invasive. As a result,
the court concluded that Bertha Colyer's privacy right to
refuse treatment outweighed the state's interest in preserving
her life.

1 68

Likewise, the other three state's interests did not prevail
over Bertha's right to refuse treatment. No third party interests needed protection because Bertha had no children, and
her family agreed that the life-sustaining treatment should be
stopped.1 69 The court was not concerned about preventing suicide, stating that death after the removal of life-sustaining
70
treatment would be from natural causesY.

Last of all, the

court did not find the ethical integrity of the medical profession at odds with this outcome. "The prevailing ethical prac163. Id; Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417,
425 (Mass. 1977). In a recent decision, the Nevada Supreme Court found a fifth state

interest: The encouragement of "charitable and humane care of those whose lives may
be artificially extended under conditions that have the prospect of providing at least a

modicum of quality living." McKay v. Bergstedt, 801 P.2d 617, 628 (Nev. 1990).
164. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 122, 660 P.2d at 743.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 122, 660 P.2d at 749 (quoting Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at 435).
167. This test of balancing the degree of bodily invasion with the state's interest in

life was
Quinlan,
168.
169.
170.

first used by the New Jersey courts in the landmark Quinlan case. In re
355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
Id. at 123, 660 P.2d at 743.
Id.
"A death which occurs after the removal of life sustaining systems is from

natural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the patient." Id.

See Saikewicz,

370 N.E.2d at 417; Robert M. Byrn, Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the
Competent Adult, 44 FoRDHAM L. REv. 1 (1975).
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tice seems to be to recognize that the dying are more often in
need of comfort than treatment. Recognition of the right to
refuse necessary treatment in certain circumstances is consistent with existing medical mores ... ."I" Because none of the
state's four interests outweighed the patient's interest, Bertha,
as a terminally ill patient, could assert a right to forego
treatment.
The court also addressed the question of who could exercise an incompetent's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment
when the person has not executed a directive and is no longer
competent to do so.' 72 First, the court stated that an incompetent's right to refuse treatment should be equal to that of a
competent person and should not be discarded solely because
1 73
her condition prevents her conscious assertion of that right.
As a result, a surrogate must exercise her rights for her.1 74 In
cases to date, surrogates have been either a family member 7 5
or the court, requiring judicial intervention. 176 The Washington court concluded that as a general practice, these types of
decisions should be handled primarily within the patient-doctor-family relationship.'7 7 The court noted that the judicial
process is a cumbersome, unresponsive mechanism for these
1 78
sorts of decisions.

In the Colyer case, Bertha' husband had been appointed as
her guardian. Under Washington law, a guardian has a duty to
assert the "rights and best interests" of the incompetent per171. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 123, 660 P.2d at 743-44 (citing Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d at
417). Note, however, the court's somewhat sloppy use of the term "necessary" in the
statement that refusing "necessary treatment in certain circumstances is consistent
with existing medical mores." One would hope that refusing necessary treatment will
never be consistent with medical mores. Presumably the court meant "necessary" to
the extent that, for example, a respirator may be necessary to keep alive a patient
whose lungs have failed. However, if the prognosis is that the patient's condition is not
curable by that respirator and if the patient has declined into a terminal, incurable
condition with no cognitive consciousness, then it is not unethical for medical
personnel to implement the surrogate's decision to follow the patient's wishes and
allow the natural process of death to follow its inevitable course.
172. Id. at 124, 660 P.2d at 744.
173. Id.; but see supra note 58, discussing the Supreme Court's rejection of this
equal protection argument, and intfra note 185, discussing problems with exercising an
incompetent's right.
174. See supra notes 13 and 70.
175. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
176. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State Sch. v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d
417 (Mass. 1977).
177. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 124-28, 660 P.2d at 74446.
178. Id. at 127, 660 P.2d at 746.
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son.1 79 As a result, the court held that a guardian did not need

a court order. Instead, he could use his best judgment about
whether the patient, if competent, would want treatment withheld, and exercise an incompetent's right to refuse such
treatment.

80

2.

In re Hamlin

Shortly after handing down the Colyer decision, the Washington Supreme Court had an opportunity to clarify the Colyer
holding in Hamlin.'8 1 This case involved a blind adult who
had been severely retarded, and thus incompetent, since birth.
As a result, Mr. Hamlin had never exercised a directive or
expressed his wishes about terminating life support. After
being admitted to Harborview Medical Center suffering from
pneumonia, Joseph Hamlin had a heart attack. The resulting
lack of oxygen completely destroyed any cerebral cortical
activity. 1 82 Hamlin was placed on a respirator to maintain his
breathing, without which he would be unable to breath and
would die naturally. The physicians treating Hamlin petitioned the court for an order authorizing termination of the
respirator after Hamlin's guardian claimed he lacked authority
to consent.
The issue in Hamlin was whether the guardian, as part of
his duty to care for the ward, could terminate the patient's life
support systems given the diagnosis that he was in a persistent
vegetative state with no prospect for regaining cognitive functions. Previously, in Colyer, the court stated in dicta that in
certain instances the judiciary must intervene to make substantive decisions about withholding treatment, such as when a
patient has always been incompetent so that his wishes cannot
be known."" The Hamlin court held that the guardian did
have the authority to consent to withdrawing life support systems."s The guardian's duties include asserting the ward's
rights and best interests, including his right to have medical
treatment withdrawn. The court noted that an incompetent
patient like Hanlin does not lose his right to consent to termi179. WASH. REv. CODE § 11.92.040(3) (1989). For a discussion of the duties of a
guardian versus guardian ad litem, see supra note 152.
180. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 129-30, 660 P.2d at 746-47.
181. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 689 P.2d 1372 (1984).
182. Id. at 813, 689 P.2d at 1374.
183. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 136, 660 P.2d at 738.
184. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 815, 689 P.2d at 1376.
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nating life support because of his incompetency.'85 Furthermore, the guardian may determine what is in the best interests
of the ward. "Just as medical intervention is, in the majority
of cases, clearly in the best interests of the ward, nonintervention in some cases may be appropriate and, therefore, in the
ward's best interest."'8 6 Thus, a guardian exercising his duty
to assert his ward's best interests8 7 has the authority to consent to withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment. 1 8 The court
emphasized that "these decisions must be made on a case-bycase basis, with particularized consideration of the best interests and rights of the specific individual . . . [distinguishing]
between treatment which is expected to result in some measure of recovery and that which merely postpones death."' 9
In dicta, the Hamlin court went on to clarify the portion
of Colyer that could be construed as requiring appointment of a
guardian to decide any treatment decisions for incompetents.
The court outlined two sets of procedures: one for Colyer-type
situations and one for Hamlin-types. In the Colyer situation,
where the patient has family members, guardianship proceedings are not a necessary predicate to making a decision about
using life-support systems. First, a prognosis committee, consisting of the treating physician and at least two other doctors
with relevant qualifications, must unanimously agree that the
185. Id. at 816, 689 P.2d at 1376. Some courts and commentators have questioned
how incompetent persons can exercise their right to consent to withdrawing medical
treatment if they are incompetent and do not have the capacity for consent. "An
incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary choice to exercise a
hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right." Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990). Their rights must be exercised
for them by a surrogate or guardian. Id.
Obviously, one concern in allowing a surrogate to exercise an incompetent's right
to consent is whether the surrogate can determine the incompetent's wishes about
consenting. Would the patient want treatment withdrawn or not? Unlike Nancy
Cruzan, who had a normal life before her injury and made statements from which the
court could infer her wishes, an incompetent like Mr. Hamlin had no period of
competence at all. The same would be true of Bertha Colyer, who became
incompetent before reaching the age of majority. Thus, the guardian or surrogate has
no basis for determining the incompetent person's intent. In these cases, the courts
are allowing the guardian to use the best-interests test for determining how to exercise
the incompetent's rights as opposed to the substituted judgment test, in which the
guardian attempts a subjective determination of the patient's intent. For a more
thorough discussion of the best-interests test versus substituted judgment, see supra
note 70.
186. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 815, 689 P.2d at 1375.
187. Id. See supra notes 154, 185.
188. Id. at 815, 689 P.2d at 1376.
189. Id. at 814-16, 689 P.2d at 1375-76.
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patient's condition is incurable with "no reasonable medical
probability of returning to a cognitive, sapient state."'" If the
incompetent patient's immediate family, treating physician,
and a prognosis committee consisting of two other physicians
agree that the patient's best interests would be advanced by
withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, the family may assert
the incompetent's personal right to refuse such treatment
without seeking appointment of a guardian or a court order to
withdraw the treatment.191
In Hamlin-type situations, where the patient has always
been incompetent and has no family members to serve as
guardian, the court must appoint a guardian 92 to act as surrogate decision-maker and ensure that the patient's best interests
are represented. 1 9 3 As in Colyer-type cases, a prognosis board
must first reach the same diagnosis as outlined above. If the
treating physician, along with the prognosis committee and the
guardian, are unanimous that life-support equipment should be
withheld or withdrawn in the patient's best interests, the
guardian may exercise the incompetent's right without prior
judicial approval. 9 4 The court noted that in either situation, if
conflicts arose between family members, the physicians, committee, or guardian, any participant could petition the court for
intervention. 95
3. In re Grant
In Grant,"9 the Washington Supreme Court extended Colyer and Hamlin to cover incompetent patients in an advanced
stage of terminal, incurable illness that had not yet degenerated into an irreversible coma or persistent vegetative state.
Barbara Grant suffered from an incurable neurological disorder' 97 that causes degeneration of the central nervous system
190. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 137, 660 P.2d 738, 751 (1983); Hamlin, 102 Wash.
2d at 819, 689 P.2d at 1378. Note that if the prognosis board is unable to agree, they
may petition the court for a decision; the court will then use a clear and convincing

evidentiary standard. Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 137, 660 P.2d at 751.
191. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 819, 689 P.2d at 1377.
192. The appointment of the guardian is governed by WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.010

(1986). See supra notes 152, 154.
193. Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d at 820, 689 P.2d at 1378.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 821, 689 P.2d at 1378-79.

196. 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445 (1987), modifed, 757 P.2d 534 (1988).
197. Batten's Disease, a genetic, neurological condition, causes degeneration of the
central nervous system and, ultimately, death. No cure is known. Victims start life as
normal children. First symptoms include blurred vision and epileptic seizures and
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and eventually death. In 1978, at age fourteen, Barbara was
declared legally incompetent, with her mother appointed
guardian. As an incompetent, Barbara was unable to execute a
living will or indicate her wishes regarding life-sustaining
treatment. 198 By 1987, Barbara's physicians estimated that she
was at the terminal stage of the disease, with no hope of
improvement. She had not yet reached a vegetative state, however. Because the state facility in which she was treated had a
policy of always using every measure possible to sustain life,
Mrs. Grant applied to the court for an order authorizing, in
advance, the withholding of life-sustaining equipment when
Barbara's vital organs failed.
The trial court ruled that the motion was premature
because Barbara was not yet in a vegetative state or in need of
life-sustaining treatment. The Washington Supreme Court,
however, disagreed. Extending its holding in Colyer and Hamlin, the court held that a person has a right to withhold lifesustaining procedures when the person (1) is in an advanced
stage of a terminal, incurable illness, and (2) is suffering
severe, permanent, mental, and physical deterioration. 9 9 Such
a right would be balanced against countervailing state interests.2" As in Colyer and Hamlin, the state's interests did not
outweigh Barbara Grant's right because the treatment would
be highly invasive, and the terminally ill patient had no possibility of returning to a cognitive sapient life.2 ° '
Moreover, for the first time, the Washington Supreme
Court concluded that artificial nutrition and hydration was a
medical means of life support by which a vital bodily function
was performed by artificial means. As a result, the court
extended its definition of life-sustaining treatment to cover all
speech difficulties. Later the child becomes blind and severely retarded. Voluntary
muscle control is lost, followed by loss of involuntary muscle function such as control
of heart and breathing. Ultimately, these vital functions fail, and the child dies. Id. at
547-48, 747 P.2d at 446.
198. Barbara's IQ was that of a normal child at age 5; by the time she was 21, her
mental age was estimated between 2 weeks and 1 1/2 months. Id. at 548, 747 P.2d at
447.
199. Id. at 556, 747 P.2d at 451.
200. Again the usual four state interests were cited. See supra note 163 and
accompanying text.
201. The court also held that the requested order was not premature because the
family anticipated that life-sustaining treatment would be required soon, and Barbara
had a right to have such treatment withheld as well as withdrawn. Grant, 109 Wash.
2d at 559, 747 P.2d at 452.
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artificial procedures that serve only to prolong life.2 0 2 The
court concluded that a terminally-ill person in Washington has
a right to have withheld or withdrawn artificial life-sustaining
procedures, including nasogastric tubes, intravenous feeding,
and any other means of artificial nutrition and hydration.0 3
Finally, the Grant court again clarified the procedure by
which life-sustaining treatment could be withheld without
prior court approval:
(1) the incompetent patient's physician and two other qualified physicians must determine within reasonable medical
judgment that the patient is in an advanced stage of a terminal, incurable illness and is suffering from severe, permanent, mental and physical deterioration;
(2) the patient's legal guardian or immediate family 2°4
must determine that the patient would choose to refuse lifesaving treatment if competent, 20 5 or, if the patient's choice
cannot be determined, the guardian or family concludes that
withholding2 the
treatment would be in the best interests of
6
the patient;

0

202. Id. at 563, 747 P.2d at 454. This definition of artificial nutrition and hydration
would not include procedures such as pain medication, which addresses the patient's
comfort level.
203. Id. at 565, 747 P.2d at 455 (Note that this part of the court's holding was
modified a year later. See infra text accompanying notes 208-213).
204. Usually, the immediate family will make any decision about withholding lifesustaining treatment. As in Hamlin, however, if no family is available and the patient
has always been incompetent, a guardian must be appointed. Id. at 566-67, 747 P.2d at
456, n.4 and 5.
205. In determining what the patient's choice would be if competent, the guardian
or family should consider the following criteria: the patient's general character and
personality, attitude towards medical treatment, and prior statements regarding lifesustaining procedures. The probative value of such statements will depend on the
context in which the statements were made, the age and maturity of the patient at the
time, and the connection between the statements and the debilitating event. When the
patient has clearly expressed her wishes about withholding life-sustaining treatment,
even if incompetent at the time, those wishes must be given strong consideration. Id.
at 567-68, 747 P.2d at 457.
206. When the patient's wishes cannot be ascertained, the following types of
factors should be considered to determine the best interests of the patient:
evidence about the patient's present level of physical, sensory, emotional, and
cognitive functioning, the degree of physical pain resulting from the medical
condition, treatment, and termination of treatment, respectively; the degree of
humiliation, dependence, and loss of dignity probably resulting from the
condition and treatment; the life expectancy and prognosis for recovery with
and without treatment; the various treatment options; and the risks, side
effects, and benefits of each of those options.
Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 567-68; 747 P.2d at 457 (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1249
(N.J. 1985) (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). Note that the
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(3) no immediate family members object to withholding
treatment; and
(4) neither the patient's physicians nor the health care
20 7
facility object to the decision.
If all of the above criteria are met, a patient's right to refuse
treatment, including artificial hydration and nutrition, may be
exercised for her by her guardian or immediate family without
prior court authorization.
C.

Problems with Washington's Common Law Solutions

Following the issuance of the Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant
decisions, Washington law seemed clearly set on a course to
allow individuals and their families to decide these types of
health care decisions privately in conjunction with their doctors. In particular, individuals now had a right to refuse lifesustaining medical treatment including artificial nutrition and
hydration in the event they became incurably and terminally
ill. Several events that occurred shortly after Grant was
issued, however, have only served to confuse the state of Washington law on this matter.
At about the same time the court rendered Grant, the
Washington State Legislature changed the Washington
Informed Consent Law" 8 to establish a procedure for making
Grant court is using a substituted judgment test, followed by a best-interests test if a
substituted judgment cannot be made. See supra notes 70, 154.
207. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 567, 747 P.2d at 456.
208. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (1989):
(1) Informed consent for health care for a patient who is not competent, as
defined in [WASH. REV. CODE ] § 11.88.010 (1)(b), to consent may be obtained
from a person authorized to consent on behalf of such patient. Persons
authorized to provide informed consent shall be a member of one of the
following classes of persons in the following order of priority:
(a) The appointed guardian of the patient, if any;
(b) The individual, if any, to whom the patient has given a durable power of
attorney that encompasses the authority to make health care decisions;
(c) The patient's spouse;

(d)
(e)

Children of the patient who are at least eighteen years of age;
Parents of the patient; and

(f)
(2)

Adult brothers and sisters of the patient.
If the physician seeking informed consent for proposed health care of the

patient who is not competent to consent makes reasonable efforts to locate
and secure authorization from a competent person in the first or succeeding

class and finds no such person available, authorization may be given by any
person in the next class in order of descending priority. However, no person
under this section may provide informed consent to health care:

(a)

if a person of higher priority under this section has refused to give such

authorization; or
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health care decisions for incompetent patients. In contrast to
Grant, in which the court required a consensus between a
guardian, immediate family, and the doctors, the informed consent law provided a hierarchical list of persons who are authorized to make informed consent decisions for incompetent
patients. The Grant court was informed of the change in a letter from Assistant Attorney General Steve Milam. 20' In
response, the court issued an order changing its decision so as
to conform with the new law, but a month later rescinded that
210
change and reverted to the original language.
On July 15, 1987, six months after issuing the original
opinion, the court modified Grant.1 ' The court was silent
about the new Informed Consent Law. Instead, Justice Durham withdrew her support from the majority opinion by Justice Callow and appended her name to Justice Andersen's
concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Andersen agreed
with the majority decision that a terminally ill, incompetent
person such as Barbara Grant had the right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. Thus, that aspect of the majority decision
was not affected. However, Justice Andersen vehemently dissented on the issue of withholding artificial nutrition and
hydration, calling it "pure, unadorned euthanasia." '1 2 As a
result, in the modified Grant decision, a new five-to-four
majority now opposed granting a guardian or family the right
to withhold artificial nutrition and hydration from an incompetent patient.2 13
This modification has caused much confusion over the
exact state of Washington law. Under the modified Grantdeci(b) if there are two or more individuals in the same class and the decision is
not unanimous among all available members of that class.
(3) Before any person authorized to provide informed consent on behalf of a
patient not competent to consent exercises that authority, the person must
first determine in good faith that that patient, if competent, would consent to
the proposed health care. If such a determination cannot be made, the
decision to consent to the proposed health care is in the patient's best

interests.
209. Letter to the Washington Supreme Court from Assistant Attorney General
Steve Milam, In re Grant (No. 52609-5) (Dec. 22, 1987). For a detailed discussion of this
event, see VanDerhoef, supra note 149, at 204-06.
210. VanDerhoef, supra note 149, at 205-06.
211. In re Grant, 757 P.2d 534 (1988). No reason was given by Justice Durham for
the switch.

212. Grant, 109 Wash. 2d at 570, 747 P.2d at 458 (Andersen, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (joined by Brachtenbach, J. and Durham, J.).
213. In re Grant, 5 ISSUES IN L. & MED. 247 (1989).
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sion, a guardian or family may not withdraw artificial nutrition
or hydration from a terminally-ill person. Nonetheless, other
courts around the country appear confused over the exact
holding in Grant. Many courts have cited Grant as supporting
the proposition that artificial nutrition and hydration are lifesustaining treatments that may be withheld or withdrawn. 1 4
Most importantly, the Supreme Court in Cruzan incorrectly
cited Grant as supporting the withdrawal of artificial nutrition
and hydration.2 15
Clearly, doctors and families need to know whether they
can withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration as one means
of artificial life-support if they meet the remainder of the
court's criteria outlined in Grant. Because the state of the law
is unclear, they may be forced to obtain a court order, defeating the very purpose of Grant, which strove to establish a procedure that would circumvent the need to go to court. This
confusion must be clarified.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF CRUZAN'S IMPACT: A COMPARISON OF
CRUZAN WITH WASHINGTON STATE LAW

Before turning to any proposals for resolving the problems
created by the Washington Supreme Court's actions subsequent to rendering the Grant decision, we must first examine
the effect of Cruzan on Washington state law and on Grant in
particular. As discussed above, 1 6 Cruzan's impact should be at
least two-fold: (1) the case finds a constitutionally protected
liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment
including artificial nutrition and hydration; and (2) the case
allows each state to develop its own procedural mechanism for
protecting that liberty interest balanced against its state interests. We shall examine each of these two impacts in turn.

214. See Conservatorship of Drabick, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840, 841 n.l., cert. denied, 109
S. Ct. 399 (1988); In re Browning, 543 So. 2d. 258, 267 (Fla. 1990); In re Longway, 549

N.E.2d 292, 294 (I1. 1989). For additional discussion of this confusion, see VanDerhoef,
supra note 149, at 206-08.

215. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2850-51 n.6 (1990).
216. See supra text accompanying notes 127-131.
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A. Cruzan's FirstImpact: A ConstitutionallyProtected
Liberty Interest in Refusing Artificial Nutrition and
Hydration Under the the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause
In Cruzan, as a predicate to holding that Missouri's rule of
decision does not violate the Due Process Clause, the Supreme
Court acknowledged for the first time the existence of a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration. As
Justice Rehnquist stated, in common parlance, this will be construed as a right to die.2 1" However, many lower courts had
previously assumed that a more fundamental interest was at
stake, subject to a high level of judicial scrutiny and protection.
They based their decisions on a fundamental right of privacy,
flowing from Roe v. Wade and its progeny."' The Court
rejected that basis, however, noting that "this issue is more
properly analyzed in terms of a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest. '219 Significantly, the Court explicitly referred to
Bowers v. Hardwick,220 a case that narrowed the Court's definition of a fundamental right of privacy and allowed a general
moral objection to serve as the justification for prohibiting certain homosexual activities. Thus, rather than finding a fundamental privacy interest broad enough to encompass a right to
refuse treatment, the Court found at best only a liberty interest, subject to minimal judicial protection. 22 1 Rather than a
strict scrutiny analysis in which the Court would provide a
high level of judicial protection for a right-to-die, the Court
established only a rationality standard. A state could meet
such a minimal standard by claiming, as in Cruzan, "no more
than a general interest in promoting life or, as in Bowers, a
general moral objection to the activity that it is attempting to
22 2
regulate or prohibit."
The impact of this limited liberty interest is two-fold.
First, this finding of a liberty interest may erode, to some
extent, the prior right-to-die cases that based their decisions on
217. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.

218. See, e.g., In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976)
and other cases cited, supra, note 8.
219. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851 n.7.

220. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
221. Kenneth R. Wing, The Supreme Court's Spring Ter't" Abortion, the Right to
Die, and the Decline of Privacy Rights, 15 J. HEALTH POL., POL'Y & L. 919, 924 (1990).
222. Id. at 925.
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a fundamental constitutional right of privacy. To the extent
that the United States Supreme Court held that a right to
refuse treatment is not based on a fundamental right of privacy, the Court knocked out the constitutional underpinnings
for most of these previous cases. The question of whether they
are still good law may result in additional litigation in numerous states. Of course, by finding a liberty interest, the Court
has in effect replaced the right of privacy with another constitutional right that must be protected. But, as noted above, this
right is not subject to as high a level of judicial scrutiny as a
"fundamental" right. Thus, "under such a standard the courts,
particularly the federal courts, have little role in evaluating
that claim or in assessing the impact of the state law on
individuals."2 2
Second, the Court's recognition of only a liberty interest
subject to minimal procedural due process protection will force
states to turn to their own constitutions if they want to provide
more protection. Many states have a more explicit privacy
guarantee in their state constitutions than is found in the
United States Constitution. Thus, even if the United States
Constitution does not include a right of privacy covering medical decisions, states may rely on their own constitutions as the
basis for a right of privacy that encompasses the right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment. This strategy has already been
adopted since Cruzan was decided. The Florida Supreme
Court based its recent decision allowing the withdrawal of artificial nutrition and hydration from an incompetent, incurable
patient on its own state constitutional right of privacy.2 2 4 The
court did not even mention a federal right of privacy or liberty
interest.225 Although issued before Cruzan, the Washington

Supreme Court's decision in Colyer recognized a constitutional
right of privacy not only in the United States Constitution, but
also in the Washington State Constitution. 2 6 Certainly the
Washington court's finding of a federal constitutional right of
privacy is questionable after Cruzan, but the court's finding of
a right of privacy under the Washington Constitution is still
223. Id.
224. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
225. Id. at 9.
226. WASH.CONST. art. I, § 7 ("No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs,
or his home invaded, without authority of law"). In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 120,
660 P.2d 738, 742 (1983); In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 553 n.1, 747 P.2d 445, 449 n.1
(1987).
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valid. Thus, the constitutional underpinnings of Washington
state law on this issue should be secure.
An equally important result of Cruzan is that the
Supreme Court, in the majority opinion, recognized that the
right to refuse medical treatment includes the right to refuse
artificial nutrition and hydration. The Court stated that "for
purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.'"227
Unfortunately, the Court's language is less than crystal clear
in this passage. Some commentators may argue that the Court
only hypothetically acknowledges that the right to refuse
treatment includes nutrition and hydration, but does not actually hold that it is included.2 28 Justice O'Connor, however,
thought that it was part of the holding. According to her, the
majority held that a protected liberty interest in refusing
unwanted medical treatment could be inferred from prior
Court decisions, and "that the refusal of artificially delivered
229
food and water is encompassed within that liberty interest.
Thus, the Washington Supreme Court's modified decision in
Grant, denying the right to terminate such treatment, may
now be unconstitutional.
Moreover, the Supreme Court is correct in concluding that
artificial nutrition and hydration should be encompassed
within a liberty interest and that people should have a right to
227. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852 (emphasis added).
228. Note also that the Court in the above passage only specifically extends this
right to refuse nutrition and hydration to a competent adult. Whether this right would
extend to an incompetent person is less clear. See supra note 58 and text
accompanying notes 85-89. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did uphold Missouri's
evidentiary rule, which would allow artificial nutrition and hydration to be withdrawn
if clear and convincing evidence of the incompetent's intent was ascertained. Thus, the
Court, by inference, was including artificial nutrition and hydration within the liberty
interest that Missouri was ostensibly protecting with its high evidentiary standard.
Since Cruzan was decided, other courts have continued to extend the
incompetent's right to refuse treatment to a surrogate decisionmaker so that the
individual will not lose the right to have life-sustaining treatment withheld on account
of her incompetency. See, e.g., In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).
Furthermore, the Washington Supreme Court in Grant was less concerned than the
United States Supreme Court with the issue of whether to extend a right to refuse
life-sustaining treatment to an incompetent. The Washington court was willing to
extend such a right and allow it to be exercised by a surrogate decisionmaker. In re
Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 566-68, 747 P.2d 445, 449, 456-57 (1987). Rather, the dilemma
for the Washington Justices in Grant was whether artificial nutrition and hydration
should be deemed life-sustaining medical treatment.
229. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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withhold or withdraw that type of treatment. A liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions concerning the state's invasions of the body. 230 The Supreme
Court has repeatedly deemed such incursions to be repugnant
to the Due Process Clause. An individual's liberty interests
are as burdened by forced medical treatment as by any other
form of state coercion. 2 1 Artificial nutrition and hydration
implicate this same concern for burdening an individual's liberty interest because artificial feeding cannot be distinguished
from other forms of medical treatment.2 3 2 According to Justice O'Connor, artificial nutrition and hydration are medical
treatments that "bears little resemblance to ordinary oral con'233
sumption of food and water.

The ability to directly infuse adequate nutrition into a
patient through artificial means has been available through
medical technology only since 1968.2" The medical technique
for implanting a feeding tube involves sophisticated, invasive
procedures by which nutrients are mechanically placed into
the patient's digestive system. A nasogastric tube is passed
through the patient's nose, throat, esophagus and into the person's stomach.23 5 A gastrostomy, or jejunostomy tube, is surgically implanted into the stomach or intestine through an
incision in the abdominal wall. 3 6 An IV line infuses nutrients
23 7
directly into the blood stream.
These artificial procedures are accompanied by significant
risks. The tubes may cause pain, bleeding, ulceration of the
stomach, infection, pneumonia, or leakage of acidic stomach
contents into the abdominal cavity. 2" Intravenous lines cause
veins to become irritated and infected, or collapse. 3 9 The
patient must be monitored daily as to weight, fluid intake, and
fluid output

240

to avoid intestinal infection, poisoning, fluid

230. Id. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
231. Id.
232. Id. ("Artificial feeding cannot readily be distinguished from other forms of
medical treatment") (citing AMA ETHICAL OPINION 2.20, supra note 77, at 13;
HASTINGS GUIDELINES, supra note 77, at 59).
233. Beatty, supra note 149, at 426.

234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at 425 n.41.
Id. at 425.
Id.
Id. at 425-26.

238. Beatty, supra note 149, at 425-26.

239. Id.
240. Id.
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overload, and other serious metabolic complications.2 41
The medical profession regards artificial nutrition and
hydration as medical treatment. 2 ' The formulas used are commercially prepared and regulated by the Federal Drug Administration as "medical foods"; the feeding tubes are likewise
regulated as medical devices.24 The position of the American
Academy of Neurology states:
The artificial provision of nutrition and hydration is a form
of medical treatment... analogous to other forms of life-sustaining treatment, such as the use of the respirator. When a
patient is unconscious, both a respirator and an artificial
feeding device serve to support or replace normal bodily
functions
that are compromised as a result of the patient's
44
2

illness.

If use of a respirator and a feeding tube are analogous medical
treatments, then no difference exists between a mechanical
device that artificially allows a person to breathe and a
mechanical device that artificially gives a person nourishment. 45 If a person has a legal right to turn off a respirator,
then that person should have an equal right to decline a feed246

ing tube.

People who are opposed to withdrawing artificial nutrition
and hydration often emotionally claim that this withdrawal is
tantamount to starvation. Nevertheless, courts and society
have previously accepted the withdrawal of a respirator, which
could be considered suffocation. Both the idea of starvation
and suffocation evoke strong emotions. Yet many will allow
the removal of respirators, but will not condone removing
nutrition and hydration.2 4 v The notion seems to be that remov241. Id. at 425 n. 46.
242. See AMA ETHICAL OPINION 2.20, supra note 77, at 13 ("Life-prolonging

medical treatment includes medication and artificially or technologically supplied
respiration, nutrition, or hydration"); HASTINGS GUIDELINES, supra note 77, at 59;
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 4, at 88 (life-sustaining treatment includes respirators

and special feeding procedures).
243. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2867 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
244. Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the

Care and Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125
(Jan. 1989).
245. Gray v. Romeo, 697 F. Supp. 580, 586-87 (D.R.I. 1988).

246. Id.
247. Kevin O'Rourke, Should Nutrition and Hydration Be Provided to
Permanently Unconscious and Other Mentally Disabled Persons?, 5 ISSUES IN L. &

MED. 181, 196 (1989).
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ing nutrition and hydration will "cause" a painful death. 2 8
Death will not occur immediately, but only after a period of
days to several weeks. The process is viewed as painful and
'249
dehumanizing, as "dying from thirst and starvation.
Removal of artificial nutrition and hydration, however, is
not necessarily painful. Patients who are near death and not
receiving nourishment may be more comfortable than comparable patients receiving conventional nourishment.25 0 Patients
in a persistent vegetative state are not believed to register pain
in any cognitive fashion. 25 ' Furthermore, if they do suffer
pain, it may be reduced to reasonable levels, usually without
unacceptable sedation.2 52
A crucial distinction exists between starving (or suffocating) a person and withdrawing artificial nutrition. When, as
the result of an incurable disease, a patient cannot chew or
swallow and a feeding tube is withdrawn, the ultimate agent of
death is the patient's underlying illness and not the withdrawal of the tube.253 As one commentator states:
Grasping the distinction between causing death and allowing
a pathology to take its natural course because there is no
benefit to the patient in circumventing or removing the
Of course, removal from a respirator also might be painful.
249. Id. at 195.
250. See Joanne Lynn & James F. Childress, Must PatientsAlways Be Given Food
and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 17, 19 (1983).
251. Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra note 70, at 398-99. "Indeed, the answer to the
question, "What is currently beneficial or burdensome to a comatose patient?" is
"Nothing." Id. at 399. Nancy Cruzan's family stated, after her death, that Nancy died
peacefully and apparently without pain in her sleep. Lewin, supra note 26, at Al.
Of course, we do not actually know whether Nancy, or any other patient in a
persistent vegetative state, is in any pain. In an existential world, we must make
medical judgments that a patient is not in pain based on deductions about deterioration
of the brain or external indicia such as the patient's lack of physical reaction to a
stimulus that we, as cognitive people, would find painful. But doctors are not allknowing, and such external indicia may or may not be reliable. As doctors and
scientists grope for an answer about what is actually taking place within comatose
patients, one is reminded of the story of the three blind men who touched different
parts of the elephant and then were asked to report what kind of animal they believed
was. present. As one might imagine, all three had vastly different theories.
Unfortunately, at present, medical science has no equivalent of a "seeing" individual
who can state the actual truth, i.e., that it is an elephant which is present, or that
comatose patients actually do not register pain, or any other awareness of self, in a
cognitive fashion. But see PRESIDENT'S COM'N, supra note 4, and PLUM & POSNER,
supra note 23, which contend that patients in a persistent vegitative state do not in fact
have any awareness of self.
252. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 4, at 50-51.
253. In re Greenspan, 558 N.E.2d 1194, 1197 (Ill. 1990).
248. Id.
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pathology, is a fine distinction. Yet it is a real and firm distinction, as those who have experienced clinical decision254
making will avow.
In 1957, when Pope Pius XII stated that respirators could be
removed if they were of no benefit to the patient, he did not
expect patients to live after removal of the respirators. Foreseeing an event that is beyond the power of the original intention is not the same as causing the unintended event.2 5 5
Not everyone agrees, however, that articial nutrition and
hydration are "medical treatment" that burden a person's liberty interest. Certainly the average person-on-the-street may
view artificially provided food and water differently from the
medical community. Opponents of withdrawing life-support
treatment argue that artificial nutrition and hydration are different from other medical procedures. At the heart of this
position is the perception that food and water are basic necessities of life that carry tremendous emotional significance. 2
"The feeding of ... [those who] are physically unable to feed
themselves, is
the most fundamental
of all human
relationships." '5 7
Regardless of whether the procedure is called "medical
treatment," artificial nutrition and hydration are clearly invasive and involve some degree of restraint and serious risk of
medical complications. Requiring such a person to endure such
procedures against her will certainly burdens her liberty, dignity, and freedom to determine her own medical treatment.
"Accordingly, the liberty guaranteed by the Due Process
Clause must protect, it if protects anything, an individual's
deeply personal decision to reject medical treatment, including
'2
the artificial delivery of food and water. 1
Moreover, the issue here is not really whether artificial
nutrition and hydration are "medical treatment." That is too
superficial and simplistic. Underlying this debate are the normative values that are in tension within the Cruzan decision.
On the one hand, are the fundamental normative values of our
254.
255.
256.
P.2d 534
257.

O'Rourke, supra note 247, at 196.
Id.
In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 559-60, 747 P.2d 445, 453 (1987), modified, 757
(1988).
Id. (quoting Daniel Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CTIR. REP.

22 (1983)).

258. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857 (1990)
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
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society such as preserving life, and providing food and water
for the sick and injured. These are some of the values which
we want our society to reflect and respect, the values that
make us moral agents. But as discussed above in Part II.E.,
these values are in tension with the equally fundamental normative value of self-determination. Concepts of physical freedom, autonomy, and self-determination are inextricably
entwined with our country's notions of liberty. 25 9 And integral
part of that self-determination is the right to make autonomous choices about one's healthcare treatment. "We can conceive of few more personal or private decisions concerning
one's body that one can make in the course of a lifetime ...
[than] the decision of the terminally ill in their ' choice
of
26

whether to discontinue necessary medical treatment.

0

In addition to notions of self-determination, the concept of
"liberty interest ... [h]as always ... been thought to encompass freedom from bodily restraint. '2 61 Imposing medical

treatment on an unwilling person inevitably involves some sort
of restraint and intrusion. Many patients must be sedated or
forcibly restrained with their hands tied or placed in mittens to
prevent removal of the tube.26 2

"A seriously ill or dying

patient whose wishes are not honored may feel a captive of the
machinery required for life-sustaining measures.

' 26 3

Requiring

a patient to remain on life-sustaining treatment forces the
patient, in effect, to give one's body to medical science without
consent264 and became a passive prisoner of technological
259. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Traditional Anglo-American law
places a high degree of value on the individual and that person's right to selfdetermination. Thus, the traditional definition of liberty encompasses at a minimum
physical liberty. Flores v. Meese, 913 F.2d 1315 (9th Cir. 1990). "Bills of rights give
assurance to the individual of the preservation of liberty . . . In the beginnings of
constitutional government, the freedom that was uppermost in the minds of men was
freedom of the body... There went along with this, or grew from it, a conception of a
liberty that was broader than the physical." Benjamin N. Cardozo, Paradoxesof Legal
Science, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NATHAN CARDoZO 311 (M.E. Hall ed.,
1947).
260. In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192 (Fla. 1989).
261. Ingram v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673-74 (1977).
262. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856-57 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
263. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
264. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 434 (Mo. 1988), aff'd sub norm. Cruzan v.
Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (Higgins, J., dissenting). In fact,
there is a certain irony in the Supreme Court's allusion to the "laboratory of the
States" as the experimental ground upon which the parameters of this liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment will be explored. By allowing the "laboratory of the
states" to limit a patient's ability to refuse new advances in medical science, including
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advances. "We could then sing, less fervently of the land of
the free, but as medical science advances to new horizons,
much more fervently of the land of the brave.

265

In conclusion, conflicting normative values are at the heart
of decisions such as Cruzan and Grant. By treating artificial
nutrition and hydration as "medical treatment" that can be
withheld or withdrawn because it burdens a person's liberty
interest, courts are acknowledging individuals' right to selfdetermination in decisions about their care at the end of life.
A number of courts, including the United States Supreme
Court in Cruzan, have now acknowledged that a person has a
constitutional right to refuse medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration, in certain situations such as
Nancy Cruzan's.

2

1

Thus, either the Washington Supreme Court or Legislature should overrule the modified holding in Grant and
declare that artificial nutrition and hydration are life-sustaining medical treatment that may be withheld or withdrawn.
B.

Cruzan's Second Impact: Each State May Develop Its Own
ProceduralMechanism for Protecting This Liberty
Interest BalancedAgainst Its Own State
Interests

In its second major impact, the Cruzan decision allows
each of the fifty states to develop its own procedures to protect
this new-found liberty interest in refusing medical treatment.
The Court sanctioned Missouri's surrogate decisionmaking procedure as one way to ostensibly protect that interest. But the
majority opinion does not endorse Missouri's or any other standard; neither does it mandate that a state give some weight to
an individual's preferences or provide a means for asserting
them.26 7 On the contrary, as Justice O'Connor noted, the
Court simply states that "[t]oday's decision ... does [not] prevent States from developing other approaches for protecting an
incompetent individual's liberty interest in refusing medical
treatment... [T]he more challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding incompetents' liberty interests
life-sustaining treatment, the Court in effect makes the patient a "laboratory for
medical science."
265. Id. at 434 (quoting Judge Teel's lower court order granting the Cruzans'
petition to remove Nancy's surgically implanted life support device).
266. For a list of such cases, see supra note 8.
267. Wing, supra note 221, at 925.
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is entrusted to the 'laboratory' of the States. ' '268
The impact of this holding is to leave the states with broad
discretion. A state may recognize patient autonomy and implement it in virtually any way that it chooses. 269 But likewise,
nothing in Cruzan requires that a state recognize patient
autonomy to refuse medical treatment. If a state decides that
its interests, such as preserving life, outweigh that liberty
interest, it may refuse to recognize the patient's treatment
choice. And, its decision will be subject only to a minimal
"rationality" standard of judicial scrutiny. Indeed, since
Cruzan was decided, some states have adopted precisely the
Cruzan formulation, whereas other states have clarified that
they do not require clear and convincing evidence of a patient's
intent before withdrawing treatment.2 70
By entrusting the protection of this liberty interest to the
states, the Court has reaffirmed the primacy of the states'
police powers, by which they may promote or protect the public's health and welfare. 271 But those decisions are made in the
legislative branch of government, again, subject to minimal
court scrutiny. Thus, decisions to terminate medical treatment
after Cruzan will be subject to legislative control and, consequently, tied to the whims of political sentiment.2 7 2
Given this broad discretion granted by the Court in
Cruzan, Washington is free to follow whatever course it
chooses. But what course should that be? Washington should
follow the procedure outlined by the Washington Supreme
Court in the original Grant decision and extend it to include
artificial nutrition and hydration. 7 ' The Grant procedure is
acceptable not only under the minimal scrutiny provided by
Cruzan, but also under the Washington Constitution's stricter
right of privacy requirement. Moreover, the Grant procedure
adequately reflects the conflicting normative values of selfdetermination versus preservation of life. The Grant proce268. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
269. Wing, supra note 221, at 925.
270. Martha Minow, The Role of Families in Medical Decisions, 1991 UTAH L.
REV. 1, 19.

271. Id. at 927.
272. Id.
273. This recommendation of the Grant procedure is based on the first Grant
decision from the Washington Supreme Court, which allowed the withdrawal of
artificial nutrition and hydration, rather than the modified Grant holding. Given the
Supreme Court's holding, see supra text accompanying notes 227-66, the first Grant
procedure should be followed.
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dure gives effect to an individual's right to self-determination
about medical treatment; at the same time, it protects the accuracy of the patient's choice about treatment by providing a procedure that uses a substituted judgment test, followed by a
best-interests test, to determine that intent.1 4 Finally, Grant
embraces yet another traditional value of our society: family
decisionmaking. The Grant procedure is preferable because it
allows family members to make medical treatment decisions in
private on behalf of an incompetent person. As several commentators have argued, families should be entrusted with
treatment decisions on behalf of a comatose or incompetent
relative "absent a specific showing of their conflicting interests
because the alternative of a state decision-maker is not presumptively better. '

275

As one commentator noted, the only

real alternative to the family is to give the power to the state
to be the decision-maker. But who in the state would decide?
A judge? The patient's nurses or doctors? Whichever real, living person would express the decision refusing the parents'
request to terminate treatment, it would not be someone who
knew the patient better than her family or cared specifically
more about her. 8
This family decisionmaking approach was adopted by the
Washington Supreme Court. Under the procedure established
in Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant, either the members of an
incompetent's immediate family, or a guardian when the
patient has no family, may act as surrogate decisionmakers to
exercise the incompetent's right, to refuse treatment. 7 In
addition, the incompetent person's doctors must be in agreement with the family or guardian about the course of treatment. This procedure adequately safeguards that person's
liberty interest while protecting against potential conflicts of
interest or abuses.
The Grant procedure has numerous safeguards to protect
against abuse. Certainly, a guardian or family asserting a
patient's liberty interest in refusing medical treatment might
act on the basis of unworthy motives, i.e., gaining an interest in
274. See supra notes 70, 205-06 and accompanying text.
275. Minow, supra note 270, at 23. See also Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra note 70,
at 375, 445-46 (advocating that courts should draw on the special qualifications of
families as decisionmakers and recognize a presumptive right of families to exercise
discretion over treatment decisions).
276. Minow, supra note 270, at 17.
277. See supra text accompanying notes 202-07.
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an estate, alleviating the financial cost of treatment, or ridding
the family of the hated "black-sheep."
In the case of a guardian, the laws controlling appointment
of guardianships protect against such dangers without requiring court intervention. A guardian is appointed by the court
and is at all times under the court's supervision. z 8 The guardian is an officer of the court under a duty to uphold the best
interests of the patient as well as the law. 27 9 Finally, a guardian ad litem is appointed during formal guardianship proceedings; the purpose of such proceedings is to ensure that an
acceptable guardian will be appointed and that the interests 2of0
the incompetent are protected during the proceedings.
These formal procedures should protect against a precipitous
decision or the appointment of a guardian with improper
motives.
Where the immediate family is acting as a surrogate decisionmaker, the protection of the guardianship proceedings are
not available. Nonetheless, this system should protect against
abuse as well as the guardianship procedure. A decision by the
family to withhold life-sustaining treatment can only be
reached after a minimum of three doctors have diagnosed that
the incompetent person is in an advanced stage of a terminal,
incurable illness and is suffering from severe, permanent,
mental and physical deterioration. The doctors and all family
members must unanimously agree to the treatment decision.
Furthermore, the doctors are under "an ethical, moral, and
legal duty to treat the patient so as to advance his recovery and
alleviate his suffering." 28 ' Grant's procedure, which requires
concurrence by at least two additional qualified physicians who
understand the patient's condition, will protect against an erroneous diagnosis or questionable motives by the family or
guardian.28 2
The only remaining uncertainty under Washington law is
whether the procedure outlined in Grant, requiring consensus
of the doctors and guardian or family, should control, or
whether the procedure outlined in the Washington Informed
278. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 11.88.010, 11.92.010 (1989).

279. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 128-31, 660 P.2d 738, 746-47 (1983); Seattle-First
Nat'l Bank v. Brommers, 89 Wash. 2d 190, 570 P.2d 1035 (1977).
280. WASH. REV. CODE § 11.88.090 (1989); Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d at 130-31, 660 P.2d at
747.
281. In re Hamlin, 102 Wash. 2d 810, 819, 689 P.2d 1372, 1378 (1984).
282. Colyer, 99 Wash. at 134, 660 P.2d at 749.
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Consent Law" s should control decisions made by surrogates
for incompetent patients. Some may argue that the procedure
established in the Informed Consent Law should be followed.
They would argue that this procedure was adopted by the legislature, which is better equipped to make law than the courts
and more accurately reflects the views of the people.
The Washington Informed Consent Law also follows that
of our sister state, Oregon, which adopted this procedure
directly into its Natural Death Act to deal with situations
where a person has not executed a written directive indicating
her wishes about life-sustaining treatment.2 4 Furthermore,
the Informed Consent Law provides more flexibility by
allowing a single surrogate decisionmaker to decide private
medical decisions without seeking a court order.
Despite these advantages of the Informed Consent procedure, the Washington legislature should adopt the Grant procedure instead for decisions involving withdrawal or
withholding of life-sustaining treatment. The Grant procedure
is preferable because the Informed Consent Law does not contain as many safeguards as the Grant procedure for protecting
against abuse. First, the Informed Consent Law is silent on
the issue of consent to withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment. As a result, the law is unclear as to
whether its provisions about "proposed health care" apply to
decisions on withholding life-sustaining treatment. Second, the
law requires a surrogate to use a best-interests test, but it does
not give any guidelines for making that decision. Grant, on
the other hand, specifies a substituted judgement test to determine the patient's intent. Only if that intent cannot be determined does the surrogate use a best-interests test, and Grant
gives guidelines for analyzing what treatment would be in the
patient's best interest. Third, the Informed Consent Law does
not require the unanimous decision of an incompetent's immediate family. Instead, the Informed Consent Law allows certain individuals, ranked in a prioritized scheme, to
singlehandedly make life and death decisions for an incompetent person. One individual could decide the nature and timing
of an incompetent person's death.285 Presumably for this rea283. WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.065 (1989). For the text of the Washington Informed
Consent Law, see supra note 208.
284. OR. REv. STAT. § 127.635-40 (1989).
285. VanDerhoef, supra note 149, at 205 n.49.

19921

Life And Death After Cruzan

son, the Washington Supreme Court rejected a motion for
reconsideration to adopt the Informed Consent law into its
Grant procedure.' 6 The court was concerned that substantial
conflicts could arise between family members, with one person
making a decision to which the remainder of the family was
opposed. 8 7
The Grant procedure, requiring a unanimous consensus
between family members, would provide more protection
against abuse while still allowing these kinds of personal decisions to be made within the privacy of the family without court
intervention. Requiring unanimity between the family and
doctors should avoid the black sheep scenario in which the
family wants to get rid of an unwanted member. It is highly
unlikely that three doctors would agree to withdrawal of treatment for this type of reason. Likewise, the need for consent of
family members prevents doctors or hospitals from "playing
God" and deciding that a patient would be "better off dead"
even though the family knows the patient expressed a clear
intent to fight to the finish before lapsing into a comatose
state. 2
The above scenario raises the concern that "the 'right-todie' could become a license to kill. 28 9 Concerns that some people will decide to pull the plug because the patient is better off
dead are legitimate. In this century alone, the world has seen
the extermination of economically disadvantaged, retarded,
and mentally disturbed persons for whom a government
decided that death was the proper prescription. 29 To guard
286. Id. at 205-06.
287. Id. at 206 n.53.
288. This scenario is all-too real. Doctors in a Minneapolis medical center
attempted an unprecedented, disturbing step: they sought court permission to end life
support for a woman in a vegetative state, despite her husband's refusal to give
consent. Susan Tifft, Life and Death After Cruzan, TimE, Jan. 21, 1991, at 67. Her
husband claimed that his spouse firmly believed that "only God should make such a
determination" and that "if anything happened to her, she didn't want anything done
to shorten her life." Id. The doctors on the other hand, did not "feel physicians should
be forced by the family to provide inappropriate medical care." Id. In light of our
Anglo-American tradition of self-determination, the courts in this type of case should
certainly give effect to the patient's prior expressed intent. Given the patient's clear
intent in the Minneapolis case, the doctors' proposed action approaches euthanasia or

even homicide. To guard against this kind of paternalistic behavior by the medical
profession, one commentator has recommended a legal presumption in favor of family
decisionmaking, with the burden falling on the doctor to challenge the impropriety of
the family's choice. Rhoden, Litigating Life, supra note 70, at 445-46.
289. In re Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 13 (Fla. 1990).
290. Id.
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against such behavior, legislatures and courts must provide
specific guidance for the limited circumstances in which a surrogate will be allowed to exercise an incompetent's choice to
withhold or withdraw life-sustaining treatment.29 1 The Grant
court outlined this type of specific procedure that will allow
families to make private, personal decisions without court
intervention, yet will guard against a slide into wholesale
92

euthanasia.2

Finally, the Grant procedure is preferable because it
allows for private family decisionmaking293 for an incompetent
person. Decisions about medical treatment have traditionally
been dealt with in privacy by a patient, her family, and physician. 9 4 Until recently, dying was considered a part of "the life
which characteristically has its place in the home." 95 That is
no longer the case. Of the approximately two million people
that die each year in the United States, eighty percent die in
hospitals or long-term care facilities.'
About seventy percent
291. As noted by Justice Blackmar in his dissent to the Missouri Supreme Court
Cruzan decision, court decisions will not open the door to wholesale euthanasia of
persons considered to be defective because a court's holding is precedent only for the
facts of its particular case. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 429 (Mo. 1988), qff'd
sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990) (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting). "The courts are open to protect incompetents against abuse." Id.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 202-07.
293. Although Grant allows private family decisionmaking, the particular
procedure may have several drawbacks. For example, the Grant procedure requires
unanimity among immediate family members. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 566-67,
747 P.2d 445, 456 (1987). Presumably if any one family member objected, the parties
would be forced to turn to the courts for resolution of the impasse. One advantage of
the Informed Consent Law is that it would circumvent this problem by allowing the
decision to be made by one family member, with that family member designated
according to a hierarchical ranking, i.e., spouse, followed by adult children, followed by
parents, followed by adult brothers and sisters. See supra note 208. On the other
hand, unanimity provides an additional safeguard against abuse and better assurance
that the wishes of the patient are in fact known by more than one person and thus will
be effectuated.
Another problem with the Grant procedure, however, is that it fails to define
"immediate family members." Who are these immediate family members? Should the
definition include only blood relatives and spouses? What about situations where the
incompetent patient has severed ties with the natural family and is closest to a
"spouse" or partner that is not given legal status under our current laws? If this
scenario arose, the parties would have to turn to the courts to define who would be
"immediate family members" for purposes of Grant. Given the current furor over
"family values" and the definition of "family," this problem is not easily resolved.
However, a discussion of how to define "family" is beyond the scope of this Comment.
294. Rhoden, LitigatingLife, supra note 70, at 437-38.
295. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
296. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2864 (1990)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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of those deaths occur after a decision to forgo life-sustaining
treatment was made. To a large extent, "the timing of deathonce a matter of fate-is now a matter of human choice. '
Many people believe that this choice should be made by
family members functioning as surrogate decisionmakers if
patients cannot make the decision themselves."9 "In short,
there is a deep-rooted and almost instinctual sense that a close
family member should make such decisions." 9 Courts should
not be involved in this traditional area, limiting these personal
decisions that should be made by a patient or the patient's family and her doctor. People should be free to carry out their
medical decisions as they wish. The preferences of a majority
of individuals, 3° ° as well as society's deeply rooted history and
tradition, lend far more support to family decisionmaking as
the favored way to make these difficult choices, rather than
forcing every family of Cruzans to drag these personal decisions through the courts over a period of years. As Justice
Stevens stated, the meaning of respect for the personhood of a
gravely ill or incapacitated patient is not easily defined:
Choices about life and death are profound ones, not susceptible of resolution by recourse to medical or legal rules. It
may be that the best we can do is to ensure that these
choices are made by those who will care enough about the
patient 30to1 investigate her interests with particularity and
caution.

In conclusion, the Washington State Legislature should
specify whether the Informed Consent Law or the Grant procedure controls in a situation involving choices about withdrawing artificial nutrition and hydration from noncompetent
297. Id. (quoting OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY AssEssMENT
SUSTAINING TECHNOLOGIES AND THE ELDERLY 41 (1988)).

TASK FORCE,

LIFE-

298. Rhoden, Litigating Life, suptra note 70, at 438.
299. Id.
300. See id. Fifty-seven percent of people polled by a President's Commission
would want a family member to make medical decisions for them in the event they
were incapacitated. Id. at 438 n.273. Likewise, the New Jersey Supreme Court noted
that recent surveys strongly supported the societal belief that families should function
as surrogate decisionmakers for patients. Id. (citing In re Jobes, 529 A.2d 434, 446 n.l1
(N.J. 1987)). The Stanford University Medical Center Committee on Ethics expressed
the unanimous view that substantial deference should be given to family
decisionmaking. Id. at 438 n.275. See John Edward Ruark et al., Initiating and
Withdrawing Life Support Principlesand Practicein Adult Medicine, 318 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 25, 30 (1988).

301. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2891 (1990) (Stevens,
J., dissenting).
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patients. Clarification is needed so that families, doctors, and
health care facilities may know the proper procedure to follow.
The legislature should adopt the Grant procedure, which will
protect against potential abuses while providing for private
family decisionmaking. Furthermore, this process should be
undertaken by the legislature, which is better equipped to
make law than the courts. The legislature can draw on its
extensive resources to make a broad policy of law based on the
direct input of its constituents, health care officials, and advocacy groups through public hearings." 2 At the same time, the

legislature should clarify that life-sustaining treatment under
this procedure includes artificial nutrition and hydration, as
determined by the Supreme Court in Cruzan.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Nancy Cruzan case was one small step by the United
States Supreme Court toward clarifying right-to-die issues.
For the first time, the Court acknowledged that individuals
have a liberty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and hydration. The procedures for protecting that interest, however, have been
delegated to the states.
In Washington state, the procedures for protecting this
right to refuse treatment are outlined in a series of cases, Colyer, Hamlin, and Grant. Although the cases are probably in
accord with Cruzan, the procedures need refinement. The
Washington Supreme Court and Legislature should embrace
artificial nutrition and hydration as a life-sustaining procedure,
as did the United States Supreme Court. In addition, the legislature should clarify whether the procedure under the
Informed Consent Law or under Grant governs consent decisions made on behalf of incompetent patients. Because the
Grant procedure provides more protection against abuse while
allowing a family to make private medical decisions without
seeking a court order, the legislature should adopt Grant as
the procedure of choice.
As right-to-die issues continue to arise, both sides will
refine their arguments and emotions will continue to run high.
The director and some of the nurses in the Missouri Rehabilitation Center believed that withdrawing Nancy's feeding tube
302. In re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 574, 747 P.2d 445, 460 (1987), modified, 757 P.2d
534 (1988).
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was immoral and should not be done. Some of the nurses
expressed concern about whether their names would still "be
on the Lord's slate" if "her blood [is] on our hands.""s On the
other hand, Nancy's family fervently believed that it was doing
the right thing in carrying out its daughter's wishes. "Knowing
Nancy as only a family can, there remains no question that we
made the choice she would want."' '
Against the background of this emotional debate, the
United States Supreme Court has found that the right to
refuse medical treatment, including artificial nutrition and
hydration, is encompassed within a "liberty interest" of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. In the case of an incompetent person who is in a persistent vegetative state, however, that person is unable to
exercise this right to refuse treatment. Because these types of
medical decisions have traditionally been dealt with in the intimacy of the family circle, that person's family should be able
to step in and exercise her right for her without interference
by the courts.
In the case of Nancy Cruzan, her "loving and caring" fam°5
ily" should have been free to carry out what it believed were
Nancy's wishes without three years of litigation. In the case of
Washington law, our procedure should enable families or a
qualified guardian to make those private decisions, with adequate safeguards to ensure that the wishes of the patient are
investigated with particularity and caution. Now the task is up
to the legislature to clarify that procedure. Future incompetent patients and their families in Washington should not have
to endure suffering like that of Nancy Cruzan and her family.

303. Anger in Hospital, supra note 100, at 29.
304. Steinbrook, supra note 26, at A17.
305. The words are those of Justice Rehnquist. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2855.

